Andando oltre la solita retorica contro gli immigrati, il 23 febbraio 2023 il Senato ha dato via libera definitiva al decreto per la gestione dei flussi migratori, il cosiddetto dl Ong. Il provvedimento, che ormai è legge, introduce una stretta all’attività di salvataggio dei migranti nel Mediterraneo.

Hanno approvato una legge per colpire e rendere la vita difficile alle organizzazioni non governative che salvano le vite in mare. Può sembrare una legge contro le Ong, ma in realtà questa è una mossa ben studiata per tenere lontano dai nostri confini immigrati e rifugiati che cercano di arrivare in Europa attraversando il Mediterraneo, a rischio della loro stessa vita. È semplicemente una guerra contro gli immigrati e i rifugiati, le persone vulnerabili che non possono difendersi.

Le Ong che violano le prescrizioni della nuova legge rischiano multe da 10mila a 50mila euro e la responsabilità si estende all’armatore e al proprietario della nave che ha messo in salvo essere umani. Allo stesso tempo, la legge prescrive il fermo amministrativo per due mesi del natante impiegato nelle operazioni di salvataggio. In caso di reiterazione della violazione, poi, è prevista la confisca della nave. La legge inoltre prescrive sanzioni che vanno dai 2.000 ai 10mila euro al comandante e all’armatore della nave che “non forniscano le informazioni richieste dalla competente autorità nazionale per la ricerca e il soccorso in mare o non si uniformano alle indicazioni della medesima autorità”. Leggi anche Sallusti contro Santoro, rissa in tv: “Combatti la Meloni e lasci soli gli ucraini”

Una legge che rende difficile le attività di ricerca e soccorso in mare è una legge che, senza dubbio, favorisce la morte in mare. È un modo velato per dire: lasciamoli pure morire. Solo chi non rispetta la vita degli immigrati e dei rifugiati poteva concepire una legge del genere.

Il governo dovrebbe accogliere l’appello che l’associazione italiana Mediterranea Saving Humans ha rivolto in una lettera al presidente della Repubblica, Sergio Mattarella, alla presidente del Consiglio, Giorgia Meloni, e al Consiglio dei ministri. “Basta guerra alle Ong, cooperiamo per salvare vite in mare,” ribadisce l’associazione, che è attiva nei soccorsi nel Mediterraneo con la nave Mare Jonio.

“Quello che dobbiamo fare è mettere al centro, qui e ora, una grande e corale azione immediata, di istituzioni e società civile, di un intero Paese, per impedire innanzitutto che altre morti innocenti insanguinino la nostra storia e il nostro mare”, proseguono da Mediterranea Saving Humans.

“Vi preghiamo – ancora – di voler mettere davanti a tutto, davanti a posizioni politiche, strategie di lungo respiro, atteggiamento ostile nei nostri confronti, solo il bene supremo del soccorso verso chi non ha colpe e chiede il nostro aiuto. Vi preghiamo di onorare fino in fondo la storia di questo Paese, della sua tradizione millenaria di accoglienza e immigrazione. Togliere mezzi disponibili e utilizzabili per i soccorsi in mare equivale in questo momento a condannare a morte centinaia di persone”, concludono dalla Ong.

Appunto, se il governo vuole salvare le vite umane, deve smettere di fare la guerra alle Ong. Deve cessare l’ostilità verso quelle entità che portano avanti, col dovere dell’umanità e delle antiche leggi del mare, attività di ricerca e soccorso. Queste organizzazioni non sono nemiche dello Stato.

A livello nazionale e locale, il governo e le amministrazioni locali hanno ottimi rapporti con le associazioni e collaborano nella fornitura dei servizi essenziali ai cittadini. Perché non si può applicare lo stesso schema di collaborazione con le Ong che salvano le vite in mare? O quelle di immigrati e rifugiati non sono considerate vite umane?

Stephen Ogongo

L'articolo <strong>Immigrazione, la guerra del governo alle Ong è solo una guerra a immigrati e rifugiati</strong> proviene da Business.it.

Quando erano in opposizione, hanno continuamente promesso di portare avanti una linea dura sull’immigrazione. Infatti,hanno basato la loro campagna elettorale su questa retorica, facendo credere all’opinione pubblica di essere in grado di tenere lontano dai nostri confini gli immigrati ed i rifugiati. 

Gli slogan come “stop agli sbarchi incontrollati dei #clandestini”, “stop agli sbarchi incontrollati dei migranti sulle nostre coste”, “In Italia, la porta principale del Mediterraneo non si entrerà più come fosse la cosa più facile del mondo”, etc. erano la punta di diamante della loro campagna elettorale. Leggi anche >>> Alatri: c’è un secondo indagato per l’omicidio di Thomas Bricca

Meloni e la sua maggioranza adesso si rendono conto che tra il dire e il fare c’è di mezzo il mare. Finalmente iniziano a capire che l’immigrazione è un fenomeno complesso che non si può gestire con gli slogan. E presto si renderanno conto che l’immigrazione è uno di quegli argomenti che si possono usare per vincere le elezioni, ma che allo stesso tempo possono facilmente far perdere la credibilità ed eventualmente perdere le prossime elezioni.

Secondo i dati aggiornati del Viminale, dal primo gennaio al 20 marzo 2023 sono arrivate 20.364 persone, contro le 6.379 dello stesso periodo nel 2022 e le 6.067 del 2021. Da qui scopriamo che gli sbarchi sono più che triplicati. E questa è la conferma che il numero delle persone che sbarcano in Italia non dipenderà mai dall’impostazione di chi governa il Paese. Il governo può avere la linea più dura sull’immigrazione che si possa immaginare ma neanche questa riuscirà a fermare gli sbarchi.  Non esiste una bacchetta magica per fermare gli sbarchi. 

Spesso gli esponenti del governo Meloni fanno delle dichiarazioni infelici sull’immigrazione che mostrano non solo un livello spaventoso di ignoranza della materia, ma anche l’incapacità di percepire la sofferenza altrui.

Dopo il tragico naufragio di Cutro dove sono morti oltre 80 migranti (34 erano minori), il ministro dell’Interno Matteo Piantedosi, ha avuto il coraggio di dire: “L’unica cosa che va detta e affermata è: non devono partire. Non ci possono essere alternative. Noi lanciamo al mondo dei territori da cui partono queste persone questo messaggio, etico prima di tutto: in queste condizioni non bisogna partire”. 

Ha aggiunto: “Io non partirei se fossi disperato perché sono stato educato alla responsabilità di non chiedermi cosa devo aspettarmi dal luogo in cui vivo ma cosa posso fare io per il Paese in cui vivo per il riscatto dello stesso”.

Queste frasi dimostrano che Piantedosi non abbia una pallida idea del perché le persone partono, intraprendendo questi viaggi pericolosi, i cosiddetti viaggi della Speranza.

Credo sia opportuno ricordare al ministro dell’Interno che queste persone non hanno la possibilità di scegliere se e quando partire. Partono per necessità, per salvarsi la vita. Non sono turisti. Sono persone che spesso sfuggono dalle guerre, dai conflitti, dalle condizioni disperati che non permettono a nessuno di scegliere se e quando partire. 

Infatti, quando partire è l’unica scelta che hai, non importa se non sei sicuro di farcela. Quella poca speranza di farcela è l’unica cosa alla quale uno si aggrappa. 

Niente può fermare le persone che si trovano in queste condizioni. Neanche la politica dei porti chiusi. 

Ecco perché invece di continuare con gli slogan inutili e pericolosi come “stop agli sbarchi incontrollati dei #clandestini”, “stop agli sbarchi incontrollati dei migranti sulle nostre coste”, bisogna affrontare le cause dietro questo fenomeno. 

I governi occidentali devono avere l’onesta intellettuale di ammettere la responsabilità delle loro politiche ingiuste nei confronti dei paesi di origine di chi sbarca da noi. Allo stesso tempo, non dobbiamo fare finta di non sapere come le nostre multinazionali sfruttano le risorse di quei paesi, impoverendo gli abitanti mentre arricchendo i nostri paesi. Dobbiamo affrontare questi problemi e cercare soluzioni che possono permettere a queste persone o di vivere una vita pacifica e dignitosa a casa loro o di venire qui in modo regolare e sicuro attraverso i corridoi umanitari. Tutto il resto è propaganda.

Una sfida che lancio ai giornalisti italiani è quella di smettere di puntare i riflettori sugli sbarchi. Questa impostazione rafforza l’odio nei confronti dei rifugiati ed immigrati. Dovrebbero invece puntare i riflettori sui fattori che spingono le persone a partire. Quando l’opinione pubblica sarà informata delle cause delle partenze, l’atteggiamento verso chi sbarca cambierà completamente. Cambieranno anche le politiche di salvataggio, accoglienza e integrazione. E neanche i politici potranno sfruttare gli sbarchi per manipolare l’opinione pubblica e vincere le elezioni.

Stephen Ogongo

L'articolo Immigrazione, Meloni e il suo governo allo sbando proviene da Business.it.

This essay approaches the international system as being within a context of total anarchy; so it takes a realist approach. This does not necessarily imply that the real world is chaotic and conflictual, but rather makes the premises that states are independent and sovereign, and furthermore that there is no higher power than the state itself. In the context of anarchy, states can be ‘dangerous’ to each other, but also do not inevitably act on bad intentions—rather in response to actions and circumstances that they might perceive as threatening. Under the premises of an anarchical world, states must ascertain strong positions in the geopolitical sphere in order to protect themselves.

Consequently, their actions are the rational result of self-interest and the reliance on self-help. Due to the circumstances, a state tends to acquire ‘hard power’ for mainly two reasons. Firstly, to maintain a certain stability of power in the new multipolar system. Secondly, as a precautionary and defensive measure to protect itself, since—in an anarchical world order— other entities cannot be counted on. In order to have a better understanding of the importance of hard power in a multipolar system, this paper focuses on the particular case of Iran, which in the past decades has been aiming to acquire nuclear power.

The essay traces the theoretical reasons behind the interest of the Iranian state in acquiring nuclear power. Specifically, since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Iran fell into a security dilemma and seemed to aim towards the re-building of the balance of power in the region of the Middle East—acquiring a strong position through the acquisition of hard power. Because of the contemporary multipolar and anarchical international system, the acquisition of hard power (in this case, nuclear weapons) by countries such as Iran has become one of the tools used to re-establish the balance of power.

From a realist standpoint, the state of nature of the international order is ‘anarchical;’ in which no actor can trust or have a previous knowledge of the true intention of the others; this system escalates into two main fundamental points. Firstly, according to Waltz, in an anarchical system “states balance rather than bandwagon,” in other words states are more concerned with their own relative power because in doing so they reduce the risk of allowing a hegemonic power to rise, an event which would threaten the security of the remaining countries. Furthermore they become the ‘balancers’ of the order in which they live, reinventing and maintaining the balance of power: a state of affairs in which no state is predominant over the other. However, with the advent of the nuclear weapons issue in the world politics, this balance of power has had to be reviewed by all entities of the international order. To a certain extent the fear of death and the fear of nuclear war have ‘obliged’ states to work for a common interest of peace, all the while maintaining the ‘realist competition’ with one another. As Hobbes, author of the Leviathon, would perceive, despite having a common purpose and a collaboration of superpowers, states are and will always be prepared to defend their own citizens and to ‘deter’ the other, and they will not count on others to accomplish their national security interests. Further, for neoclassical realists, all these ‘arrangements’ will be embraced automatically, since the balance of power is ‘imposed by external events’, and is a natural process.

In other words, if one country pursues the nuclear power, other states are likely to pursue the same power, in fear of allowing that state to rise as a hegemonic power. Secondly, since the state is sovereign, it must situate itself in a way that allows it to protect and sustain itself, as no other entity can be counted to do so, due to the mistrust inherent in the anarchical system. As Hobbes states: “Every sovereign hath the same right in procuring safety of his own people, that any particular man can have in procuring the safety of its own body”.

Therefore, the acquisition of hard power plays a significant role in the matters of national security, leading states into a relationship of dynamic of competitiveness with one another, based on the so-called security dilemma. The conditions of the security dilemma occur when an actor improves its national security by the means of hard power (such as the nuclear weapon), an act which is likely to be perceived by the others as aggressive and threatening. Moreover, this condition provokes counter-moves from other states. Explained by Sagan as “proliferation begets proliferation”, every time a state pursues nuclear weapons in an attempt to re-balance the power, it creates a nuclear threat to another state, which in turn will also wish to develop its own, for its own matters of security.

In the Iranian case, most of the policies are shaped by the political instability of the region, known as “questions of Persian Golf security” (Volker 2010, 95). With regards to its geopolitical condition, the country finds itself in between the two nuclear powers that are Pakistan and Israel. Moreover, its borders witness ongoing wars in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, wherein US troops are involved.

In addition, is well known that ‘bad’ and unreliable relations with western countries put Iran in a position of constant mistrust and self-help behavior. In fact, according to Volker, two types of policymakers can be observed in Tehran: those who have a little trust towards the West, and those who do not have any. Further, the country is seen as a rational actor that calculates its risks and opportunities with little interest towards the security of others, but rather with a large concern towards its own national security.

It is important to mention that—although US- Iranian relations have been mostly turbulent and insufficiently transparent—prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11 that shocked the world, Iran was already making efforts to pursue peace in the region, and even collaborating with the US to a certain extent. Iran supported the invasion of Afghanistan, and was collaborating with the United States in order to defeat the terrorist groups (such as the Taliban) in the region. In order to do so, Iran reinforced its border’s securities and agreed to apprehend Al-Qaeda fighters fleeing through its borders, as well as rescuing Americans near its borders. Nevertheless, the terrorist attacks on September 11 certainly marked a shift in how global security was perceived: it demonstrated how national borders were becoming fragile in the new multipolar and interdependent system. In other words, the attack re-emphasizes the importance of the state in its role of protecting its citizens. Indeed, as argued by B. Miller, after 9/11 the US changed to a more liberal offensive strategy—as manifested by the Bush Doctrine and the wars against Iraq and Afghanistan with the ensuing ramifications in the following years.

Indeed, the Iranian security dilemma was fueled by the claims of the Bush Administration, which portrayed Iran as a terrorist country, and part of the ‘axis of evil’ in the world. Consequently, Iran has two main reasons for pursuing nuclear power. Firstly, the country pursues a re-balancing of power in the region. As mentioned before, Iran finds itself in an unstable geopolitical position, and can re-stabilize the region by acquiring nuclear weapons.

As exemplified by Waltz, there is an analogy between historical rivals India and Pakistan: both acquired nuclear facilities. Both countries realized that a factor more dangerous than the adversary’s nuclear deterrent was the “instability produced by challenges to it,” and although ongoing tensions between the two remain present, they still maintain peace. According to Waltz, this condition could also apply in the Middle East. Secondly, the security dilemma in which Iran find itself plays a role in the inclination to pursue nuclear facilities. Although it is almost impossible to predict the actions of the state, it is likely—according to Waltz—that the aim of the country’s is in improving its own security and defensive capabilities, seeing as Iran has been ‘isolated’ in the international arena. Furthermore, considering the country a rational actor in an anarchical world, neither premises posed by Iran to justify the acquisition of nuclear facilities should be viewed as a threat, but rather as a natural re-shaping of the international order.

However, a common counterpoint to this idea (that reshaping the balance of power through state acquisition of nuclear weapons will bring stability to the international world order) is that acquisition instead deepens distrust and threat. According to a liberal perspective of International Relations, a state poses a threat to the international security when it acquires this kind of hard power, one which can only be contained through the formation of rivals and enemies. Indeed, despite his realist view of the world, Hobbes states that one of the major reasons for a state to go to war is the diffidence between states. Applying this theoretical framework to the Iranian case, the possible success of acquiring nuclear power could lead to a condition of security dilemma in other countries in the region, which will eventually create imbalances rather than a balance of powers. As commented by the Saudi media in 2006, Iranian acquisition of nuclear facilities “will make the region hostage to Iranian political conduct.” A parallel to this can be observed in East Asia, where North Korean possession of nuclear weapons has incentivized South Korea and Japan to improve their nuclear programs as well. Moreover, the act could also have domestic impacts, ones which would not benefit Iranian society. Indeed, the sanctions imposed on Iran by the US and its alliances are some of the most complex, and even harm the Iranian economy to a certain extent.

These sanctions have been ongoing since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, targeting one of the most important sectors of the Iranian economy: the energy sector. This then impedes the country from entering into the financial system. However, in 2013—with the election of the moderate president H. Rouhani—the US became open to finding cordial relations with Iran under certain conditions: the Islamic country limits its nuclear program. On this view, any continued Iranian pursuit of nuclear proliferation could isolate the country even more, and harm the domestic economy, which would put the legitimacy of the Iranian government in jeopardy. Further, seeing as “Atoms for peace and atoms for war are Siamese twins,” the proliferation of nuclear facilities in the multipolar order provokes different stand points as to whether it promotes stability or imbalance. Moreover, the significant changes in the distribution of power in the post Cold War and 9/11 international system have emphasized the importance of national security.

These events have deepened the distrust between nations, as well as giving them a larger share of responsibility when it comes to the maintenance of peace and balance of power. The Iranian case is an example showing that in this anarchical and multipolar order, national security is indeed becoming an important priority, with many countries falling into a condition of security dilemma. In addition, the Iranian case exemplifies one way of restoring the balance of power in the region: the acquisition of nuclear facilities. It is clear that hard power still plays a significant role in global affairs, however it is debatable whether it establishes a balance of power, or imposes distrust, threat and imbalance to the international system.

L'articolo Proliferation of nuclear weapons: Iranian case proviene da Business.it.

Thus, this essay will firstly look at Iran prior to the overthrow of Mossadegh and the role of Fadayan-e Islam. Next, Fadayan-e Islam’s ideology and the rise of their opposition towards Mossadegh will be explained in further detail. Finally, different arguments will be given on why the Fadayan-e Islam were one of the main reasons and supporters of the coup and some counter arguments will be taken in consideration and explored. This essay will refer to academic articles written by acclaimed researchers and will consider leaked documents by the CIA to sketch an as much as possible truthful image of the occurred events.

With the discovery of oil in the Iranian soil, in the beginning of the 20th century, foreign interests, especially Britain’s increased. This discovery led to the creation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and strengthened the bonds of Iran with the Western World. The establishment of new relationships created the beginning of an era of modernization and change. Faghfoory, researcher at International Society of Iranian Studies argues that “The process of modernization in Iran was accompanied by a considerable degree of change in social stratification. New social classes and occupational groups emerged and the power of the old and traditional elites declined.” This decline and change of power dynamics created an uproar amongst many, especially amongst the Ulamas (religious leaders). The Ulamas believed that the process of modernization was against their Islamic values and would destroy the societal values of the country. Another group who also criticized the government was Mossadegh’s small opposition party in the parliament, the National Front. This political group believed that Iran’s natural resources should be controlled by the Iranians and not by the British. This created a tension between the Shah and Mossadegh. The Ulamas, of whom some were members of the Fadayan-e Eslam and Mossadegh had started to find a common ground. Both were against the foreign intervention in Iran.

“After Reza Shah’s downfall, religious leaders actively sought to regain their former power and influence, and almost immediately all religious practices prohibited under him returned.” Many Iranians started to support these religious groups who spoke out and demonstrated massively against the new Shah. Fadayan-e Eslam assassinated many reformers of whom some were ministers at the time. At first, Fadayan-e Eslam and Mossadegh seemed to understand each other’s nationalistic political strivings, but with time and after the assassinations it soon became clear that their paths could not cross. Mossadegh received support from many secular groups such as the Tudeh Party which contravened with the beliefs of the Fadayan- e Islam. Soon Mossadegh became the next target on the assassination list of the Fadayan- e Eslam.

Fadayan-e Islam was mainly composed out uneducated, extreme religious people of the lower class of a very young age. Though they received some support from wealthy merchants and students, the nucleus of the group consisted out of a small religious fanatic men who strived to change the social and economic situation of the country. Their leader was a young cleric called Navvab Safavi. In his view Islam was the most unique way of life and he was convinced that Islam alone could answer to all the questions about how to live.

This is how the group started to differentiate itself from all the other groups. The Fadayan-e Islam opposed any politicians, especially those of the ruling Shah and tried to assassinate and overthrow the system. They were convinced that sovereignty belonged only to God. With the rise of Mossadegh’s party and his increasing support by the Iranians, his party, the National Front became the next target of the Fadayan-e Islam. Mossadegh’s stance on secularization created a greater tension. As the Fadayan- e Islam believed that secularization would threaten the traditional Islamic values and believed that this ideology was the result of Western-influence.

By 1951, Mossadegh’s National Front had won the majority seats of the parliament. During this period Mossadegh worked closely with one of the close allies of the Fadayan- e Islam, Ayatollah Kashani. Mossadegh believed that Kashani could mobilize the religious people and win their support for his party and his oil nationalization plans. After a several years of close cooperation the relationship between Mossadegh and Kashani decreased. Mossadegh realized that the Fadayan-e Islam are causing political instability in the country. Mossadegh as a secular did not want to create an Islamic state and was against the violent behaviour of Kashani’s mobs.

In 1953 the situation become more instable. Mossadegh had lost one of his most powerful allies. Ayatullah Kashani who criticized Mossadegh more often because of his secular views reduced his support for Mossadegh’s plans to a great extent. Fadayan-E Islam’s most powerful opponent at that time remained Mossadegh. In order for them to be able to execute their Islamic government plans, they had to get rid of Mossadegh’s government. Many argue that without the active and secret actions of the Fadayan-E Islam, the government of Mossadegh had never been able to be overthrown. Other claim that the coup was an organized operation known as Operation AJAX conducted by the CIA and the British Intelligence Services. Yet, when looking at Iran from the inside, one things is clear: the internal instability of the country created unrest. This unrest resulted in many government changes and power shifts. Though the external factors such as the British and American intervention played a big role in overthrowing Mossadegh, this could never have been done without the political divisions in the country. The powerful and increased role of the Fadayan-e Islam can be seen as one of the main reasons behind the Iranian 1953 Coup d’état.

Looking back at documentations, there is a visible power shift and internal instability pattern. Yet at that period in history, all seemed more unclear and unorganized. Now after all the leaked documents, researchers and governments are still not hundred present sure about the main power behind the coup. There are many different stances and perspectives about how the coup was arranged and by whom. One thing is for sure; the Iranian 1953 Coup d’état changed the course of the Iranian history and influenced the twenty years later Iranian revolution in 1979 where the Shah was overthrown and an Islamic government was established. This establishment of an Islamic government was exactly what the Fadayan-e Islam fought and strived for. Now after more than sixty years, the secular ideas of Mossadegh and his government have no place in the Iranian society and have been replaced by the ideologies of people like Navvab Safavi and Ayatullah Kashani.

Sources:

Wolfgang, Kurt Kressin. Prime Minister Mossadegh and Ayatullah Kashani from Unity to Enmity: As Viewed from the American Embassy in Tehran (Texas: University of Texas at Austin, 1991)

National Security Archive of George Washington University. “CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup Documents Provide New Details on Mosaddeq Overthrow and Its Aftermath” Last modified August 19, 2013. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/

Ferdows, Adele. Religion In Iranian Nationalism: The Study of the Fadayan-i Islam (Indiana: Indiana University, 1967)

Faghfoory, Mohammad H. The Impact of Modernization on the Ulama in Iran, 1925-1941 (Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 1993) P. 277.

Ahmad Kasravi, Haj Ali Razmara, Hassan Ali Mansour and many more were assassinated by members of the Fadayan-e Eslam.

L'articolo Fadayan-e Islam and their role in the Iranian 1953 Coup d’état proviene da Business.it.

i. Improve the visibility for military operations by defoliation of trees
ii. Destruction of food supplies of the enemies.

The military logic was as follows: since the communists used the jungle as a weapon against the US, it had to be neutralized. Recent studies show that 20% of Vietnam’s jungles have been sprayed at least once. But rice and other agricultural products were also targeted. Up to 40% of herbicides were used against crops. Although the military tried to differentiate between the rice fields of friends and enemies, 10 million hectares were sprayed with a blue agent, which ended the harvest within hours. The third main use of herbicides was to wipe out all the green around US military bases, thus creating a security perimeter.

The effects of all herbicides were temporary and had to be reapplied after some time. For this, they were used from backpacks on the back to boats to spray the banks. But it was a small fleet of C-123 Provider planes and helicopters adapted to lift 3,800 liter tanks that led the Ranch Hand project, with more than 19,000 flights between 1962 and 1971.

The soil of 16 other American air bases in both Vietnam and Thailand is contaminated, and many of the Vietnamese and Americans exposed at the time developed disease. But little is known about Agent Orange’s impact outside the bases. Next to Bien Hoa is the city of the same name, home to 900,000 people. Even today, fishing in rivers and lakes in the area is prohibited.

Although it is estimated that there are still three million Vietnamese suffering from the effects of defoliants, there is no follow-up similar to that of American veterans.

The consequences? Agent Orange was found to cause a number of serious health issues including to be the cause of chlorance, Hodgkin’s disease, cancer and peripheral nervous system dysfunction. Despite Monsanto’s claims and denials of its responsibility for Agent Orange a public document came after that disproved their defensive argument. The manufacturer knew about the harm and danger that Agent Orange poses to humans.

Exactly 40 years after the end of the war, which is estimated to have killed 3 million people, questions regarding the potency and reach of this toxic substance remain open. And they are increasingly difficult to answer, as a second and now a third generation of children are born in Vietnam with a high incidence of disabilities like Down syndrome, cerebral palsy and extreme facial disfigurement.

Comprehensive research would be the only way to understand exactly what is happening in Vietnam and the extent to which Agent Orange is a factor in children’s deficiencies, argues Jeanne Stellman. This would not require significant investments, but political engagement. And he is insufficient.

“There is an intentional blockade by some elements of the US government,” she accuses, also pointing to the presence of “strong forces” opposing a comprehensive investigation in Vietnam. As an exporter of catfish and other foodstuffs, that Southeast Asian country does not want to give the world the impression of being polluted with dioxin.

For half a century, Vietnamese victims of this product have been fighting legal battles against the producers of the herbicide. The outcomes? Lawsuits dismissed, voices drowned out.

Situations such as the one in Vietnam demonstrate that the use of chemical weapons has both acute and chronic effects on human health and the environment. Therefore, the use of such compounds is reprehensible.

But this incident should not be forgotten but remembered to prevent it from happening again in the future. It even serves to alert companies and corporations that use chemical agents in their activities. It is essential to understand the toxicological risks, their impact on human health and to know how to care for victims in case of poisoning.

L'articolo Monsanto and its Legacy in Vietnam – Operation Ranch Hand proviene da Business.it.

The narrative presents a man who is condemned to death in 19th century France. The thoughts, cogitations, feelings and fears are all self-reported while he waits for his execution. During the narrative, Victor Hugo represents the last days of the condemned man. Interesting and insightful detail of the novel is that the author does not reveal the crime committed or the motivations of the death penalty. The reader does not even know if the convicted man regrets what he has done.

On the other hand, we know that the condemned man curses another crime. The one of the State – by condemning a man to death, the State will leave his daughter with no father, no family structure, and with a social stigma that will hunt her for life.

By not specifying the nature of the crime done by the convicted person Victor Hugo makes the reader understand that the death penalty is not governed by particularities of cases; the narrative does not appeal to sentimentalism based on a sad life story. Also, the reader is not seduced with the long appeal of innocence; to the contrary, the author reveals to us with mastery that regardless of crime and context.

The judicial sentence of the man is understood in the book as a real human experience and not just a legal procedure. Importance is given to the questions of morality that arise from the mechanism in which a man has the divine power of life and death over another. Presenting mental and physical constraints within the window of time and of inevitability is what highlights the inhumane mechanism it is in place, which once started cannot be stopped. Within the boundaries of inhumanity is where we find the most humane experience.

“They say that is nothing, that one does not suffer, that is an easy end; that death in this why is very much simplified. Ah then, what do they call this agony of six weeks, this summing up in one day? What then is the anguish of this irreparable day, which is passing so slowly and yet so fast? What is this ladder of tortures, which terminates in the scaffold?
Victor Hugo, The Last Days of a Condemned Man –

They say there is nothing; this death is ‘easy.’ This section is far less graphic than other parts of the novel but deals with the psychological aspect of a death sentence. The narration describes in detail what happens to him from the moment of the sentence until he finds himself on few seconds from being decapitated. The insight into what goes through a man’s mind once he knows he is going to die.

Moments before his execution, his three years old daughter goes to visit him. He just wants to believe that what is happening is not true, it’s all a nightmare, but when he understands its reality, he asks and begs for pardon. Hope is the last to die. He looks for God to comfort but not being a believer, he finds nothing. Instead, he tries to escape from his past memories of childhood. He just begs for more time.

This novel is about a living-dead man. He curses the punishment of the State that will leave his daughter alone bearing life with no father, and he leaves a will which basically won’t be worth much as the “the guillotine is expensive”.

He tries to be ‘remembered’ to leave something in this world, but not even that is granted to him.

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L'articolo The last day of a Condemned man proviene da Business.it.

The manifestation had a lot of news coverage as it was the largest protest ever held by women in the country. The manifestation was organized on social media by a Facebook group called “United Women Against Bolsonaro” founded by Ludmilla Teixeira – 36 years old, advertising executive – to coordinate the acts against the presidential candidate (Philips, 2018). The page presented the manifestations as an act “Against the progress and strengthen of machismo, misogyny, homophobia, and other types of discrimination” (Veja Politica 29 Set. 2018). The manifestation was named after the hashtag #EleNão (#NotHim) created on the 12th of September by the “Feminist Movement in Repudiation of Bolsonaro.” Since then, the hashtag has been used on social networks, including by celebrities – national and international. Additionally, two days before the protests (27th of September), the group had shared its manifesto against the candidacy of Jair Bolsonaro; contextualizing and explaining the reasons for the protest (Brasil de Fato 27 Set. 2018). Lastly, it is important to mention that the group has been hacked several times, and since the 22nd of January 2019, the name of the group has changed to: “Mulheres Unidas Com o Brasil,” although the group description on Facebook continues the same.
Profile of the Participants

According to a survey based on interviews carried out by the Research Group on Public Policies for Access to Information at USP (University of São Paulo) the manifestation in the city of São Paulo was the biggest in the whole country. The survey revealed that 80 percent of its parts participants identified themselves as left-wing (de esquerda), 8 percent as center-left and only 1 percent as right-wing, the rest did not answer (Schreiber 2018). Additionally, 76 percent declared themselves as not conservative, 75 percent not anti-petista, and 70 percent feminist. Lastly, 31 percent declared to have a family income superior to five to ten minimum wages, and another 26 percent declared to earn more than 10 minimum wages. During the manifestation in different cities according to many journals and uploaded pictures it was possible to see flags and stickers promoting political parties and presidential candidates; including Fernando Haddad (Workers Party); Guilherme Boulos (Socialist and Free Party); Ciro Gomes (Workers Democratic Party); Manuela D’Avila (Communist Party of Brazil).

Women for #Ele sim

Two days after the manifestation a survey was published by IBOPE (Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística) concerning the ‘intentions to vote for Bolsonaro’ which had increased by 6 percent among women (Pierry, 2018). According to Marcio Coimbra – Brazilian political analyst – the movement did not help in altering ‘Bolsonarist’ votes because the manifestation was perceived as an alliance with the PT party the other left-wing parties (Pierry, 2018). Moreover, he commented that the findings of the Research Group on Public Policies for Access to Information at USP show a specific profile of protestors and many further studies can be done related to the outcomes of the protest #Ele Não. It can be argued that “gender equality has become politicized” as many other women, who directly rejected ‘the feminist agenda,’ were backing up the candidate Jair Bolsonaro (Watson, 2018). Many other events should be taken into account to understand the shift of women’s vote, as it is important to understand the reasons why Jair Bolsonaro was the choice for a substantial number of women.

Analysis: The Feminist Product of #EleNão

An analysis of two texts related to the manifestation #EleNão is conducted in this section. This is done in order to understand the discursive construction of the feminist identity by analyzing the ideological discourses in these texts. Indeed, Ideological Discourse Analysis is used in this chapter to find the key discursive constructions of identity. The text being analyzed is the manifesto proposed by the group “Women United Against Bolsonaro” which is representative of the protests and those who adhere the protests.

‘Manifesto Mulheres Unidas Contra Bolsonaro’

Themes, Topics, Context: The title of the manifesto that gave voice to millions of women in the manifestation #EleNão (Not Him) in Brazil is: “Manifesto das Mulheres Unidas Contra Bolsonaro” (Manifesto of United Women Against Bolsonaro). This title already conveys the idea of the main topic which is a critique to Bolsonaro’s discourses, that according to the manifesto, attacked the moral and democratic principles of the nation. Moreover, the main topic also concerns the resistance against gender and other minorities’ discriminations. The context in which the manifesto was written and then published was during the presidential campaign of 2018. The theme is mainly political and supportive of the fights against discrimination of minorities. While reading through the text it is also possible to indicate more political allegations which regularly relate to specific gender or minorities issues. The manifesto starts with the description of the in-group goals which focus on broad themes such as equality, freedom and the right to live with no violence or fear. Also it explains the motive behind their actions, that is: “[…] ameaça nossas conquistas e nossa já difícil existência.” The threat to an already ‘difficult existence’ shows the power-relations that are constructed in the manifesto, where women position themselves as less empowered than the ‘other.’ Moreover, the manifesto exposes a self- identity description entitled “Quem somos?” following, they refer to themselves as:

“Somos mulheres,milhões e diversas […] negras, brancas, indígenas. Trans e travestis. Somos LGBTs, amamos homens, mulheres ou ambos. Casadas e solteiras. Mães, filhas, avós. Somos trabalhadoras, donas de casa, estudantes, artistas, funcionárias públicas, pequenas empresárias, camelôs, sem teto, sem terra. Empregadas e desempregadas. Mulheres de diferentes religiões e sem religião”

“Who are we?” “We are women, millions and diverse […] black, white, indigenous, transgenders, we are LGBT, we love women, men or both. Married and single. Mothers, daughters, grandmothers. We are hardworking, housewives, students, artists, public servants, small business women, street vendors, homeless, landless. Employed and unemployed. Women of different religions and without religion.”

This self-description creates an image of multiple and dynamic identities; it expresses inclusivity and encompasses multiple opinions with regards to the understanding of the identity of its members. This type of inclusive discourse might be related to the understanding of multiple ‘othering’ referred by Hernández – Truyol in describing feminist identity in Latin America and in Brazil. Further, this manifesto embraces also other minority groups in its self-description, such as the LGBT community. The text also includes a description of the ‘other,’ namely Jair Bolsonaro. His description is a bound and short paragraph only stressing how he is no different than any other ‘old’ politician. Overall, it can be argued that the manifesto presents political implicatures, such as the idea that Bolsonaro’s voters are subscribing to his homophobic, racist, sexist and other narratives. Further, as previously mentioned, it is part of the ideological strategy to outline discourses according to the ‘ideological square format’ proposed by Van Dijk (Appendix 1).

Lexicons and Local Meanings: Other essential points to evaluate are local meanings and lexicons. The management of clarity and vagueness (level and precision) throughout the manifesto – when describing the in-group and out-group or when exposing events – is a crucial tool for the construction of rhetorical structures that persuade recipients to pay attention to specific meanings. Indeed, the self-description – previously analyzed – is more detailed and longer in length than the description of the other (granularity). Therefore, it does not provide a complete profile of the other, but it develops identity markers for the in-group category.
Another example of the usage of vagueness and clarity is found under the sub-headline: “Why are we against Jair Bolsonaro?” where words are directly quoted from Jair Bolsonaro misogynist statements perceived by many Brazilian women as machistas allegations: “ Diz que o nascimento de sua única filha mulher foi uma ‘fraquejada’”( I had four sons, but then I had a moment of weakness, and the fifth was a girl ) “Considera quilombolas ‘vagabundos’” (He considers quilombos a ‘bum’ place) “ Para ele, dar ‘porrada’ em meninos impede que eles ‘se tornem’ gays” (For him, ‘spanking’ boys prevents them from ‘becoming gay’) (lexicon and precision). Moreover, comparisons that are made throughout the text explicitly highlight identity-markers of the ‘in-group’ while implying negative score for the ‘out-group.’ In particular, this statement:
“Nós defendemos o oposto do que ele prega […] defendemos o respeito às diferenças; […] defendemos salários iguais entre homens e mulheres, entre negros e brancos; defendemos cotas para os que foram historicamente injustiçados e prejudicados; defendemos serviços públicos com qualidade para as mulheres pobres e seus filhos.”
“We defend the opposite of what he preaches […] we respect differences, equal wages between black and whites, we defend quotas for those who have been historically wronged […] we advocate for good public services for poor women and children.”

These identity-markers create the idea of an empathetic and solidary group especially concerned with disadvantaged people, such as poor women or those who have been historically wronged. From this conceptualization of identity they trace political implicatures such as the urge for the necessity of quotas or affirmative actions.

Syntax and Format: In ideologically marked argumentations is often evident the presence of fallacies – either by its appealing to emotional feelings to support the conclusion of the argument or by its appealing to a forceful rationalization of the conclusion – and/or topoi (made-arguments). For instance, in the manifesto, the display of the cases of Marielle Franco and Anderson were appealing to emotional feelings to support the argument that the security plan of Jair Bolsonaro would cause more deaths. As already mentioned, arguments have a persuasive function either explicit or implicit. In this case: “Não queremos ditadura ou fascismo nem a ampliação da matança policial-militar nas ruas responsável pelo genocídio da juventude negra;” (We don’t want dictatorship or fascism nor the widening of the police-military killing in the streets responsible for the genocide of black youth) there is again the appeal for empathy and solidary feelings towards the ‘black youth’ in order to defend their previous argument against the security project plan of the candidate.

Lastly, while describing Jair Bolsonaro the in-group infer to have the the evidence to prove that Bolsonaro is like any other ‘old’ politician, in this statement: “Ele se apresenta como algo “novo” mas, é, na verdade, mais um “político de carreira” (He presents himself as someone ‘new’ but it is not true) their justification (evidentiality) follows: “[porque ele] usufrui de privilégios, como o imoral auxílio moradia, enquanto milhares de famílias estão sem teto e lutam por um lugar digno para morar” (because Bolsonaro benefits from political privileges while many poor Brazilian families have no home where to live). In this last statement, the manifesto argues by using rationalization and appeal to popular feelings to justify its argument. The conclusion of the manifesto is presented in the last two lines which repeat the comparison between bolsonaro and the in-group members that leads again to the reasons behind the manifestation. Also the re-empathization of chosen adjectives underscore the candidate “Por isso dizemos: Ele Não! Nem os filhos! Bolsonaro Nunca! Fascismo não!” (This is why we say: Not Him! Not even his children! Bolsonaro Never! Fascism No)

Comments on the analysis

The manifesto analyzed shows what kind of identity the women that participated in the manifestation tended to portray. First, and most importantly, women in the group constructed their identity in opposition to Bolsonaro’ s ideas. Indeed, it is crystal clear that the members stand against everything related to Jair Bolsonaro’ s discourses and actions. Second, while reading throughout the manifesto, it is possible to identify the in-group appeal to emotions of the recipients to attract a degree of empathy with the movement. Part of this appeal to emotions is done through victimization of the in-group’s members. This generates an explicit polarization because it organizes the discourse in binary opposition: oppressors (He) versus oppressed. Additionally, the ideal presented in the manifesto is coherent with the general trends of the Brazilian feminist movement, which is: to break with old cultural patterns such as machismo and marianismo. Nevertheless, by doing so, the manifesto excludes a significant part of Brazilian women who are part of a more conservative (traditional) group, who mitigate and stress the positive sides of marianismo and machismo. Moreover, the manifesto speaks up for inclusiveness, and it embraces all minorities’ struggles. However, it does not seem as inclusive with political views.

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L'articolo The Biggest Protest lead by Women In Brazilian History: #Elenão proviene da Business.it.

The US forces invaded the country back in 2001, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, resulting in the longest-running military combat in the history of the United States. At the time the US checks and balances failed, as did the UN. War i snot declared on a country to chase after a foreign group in that nation. Even with Afghanistan invaded, it took 10 years to reach Osama bin Laden which ended up not even being in Afghanistan. US intelligence eventually located him in Pakistan.Without the invasion, the US could have found a way to deliver the criminal at a lower cost. Of course, many other problems arose from the ill-fated invasion, and these past mistakes are hunting the present stability of the country.

According to Brown University, between direct and indirect costs, the war took US$ 2.2 trillion so far. Officially, the onslaught cost about $1 trillion over the years, equivalent to the domestic infrastructure investment program approved a few days ago in the US Congress. Despite much talk about the reconstruction of Afghanistan out of the trillion dollar cost sunk in the war, only about US$ 40 billion was directed to humanitarian aid and the country’s development, which, let’s say it, is a very low percentage. The rest was mostly for war and security expenditures. The other $88 billion left with the Afghans was directed towards building these local security forces, which have been falling to the Taliban since the US began its withdrawal.

The destruction/construction balance leans heavily towards the sunk cost situation. This model of military occupation without the prospect of economic and cultural commitments works less than colonialism in the era of overseas empires, which no one wants to return. In Afghanistan, this is much less clear. The US entered and, within a few weeks, dislodged the Taliban. Now they leave, and in a few weeks, the Taliban return with the usual violence. Legacy? It is not known.

At best, we are back in a situation as bad as 20 years ago. So it’s time to invest in something different and less deadly. For when the effort goes to what you like, there is no sunk cost dilemma. This is true for personal and affective relationships, but also for many civil and political decisions. The US can invest a lifetime in its own country without questioning whether the nation is viable, nor imagining that there would be a better return on investing elsewhere.

For now, the Afghans, sunk in their occupied lands, have to fight once more for those who are fighting; fleeing to those who are not of death; climb the mountains to try to see a different and better future beyond the pile of collateral damage and debris left behind.
Apart from asking for prayers and thoughts for Afghanistan we should demand policy change.

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L'articolo Taliban: Source of Miscalculation proviene da Business.it.

Assuming that we will never go back to ‘normal’ as governments have subtly changed core dynamics of thought and action, Thomas Hobbes claimed that human life is “nasty, brutish, and short.” We should not be surprised if tyranny replicates itself time and time again, in very similar ways throughout history.

Generally, tyranny starts from a systematic abuse of language and logic used by those we uphold as authorities; they do it in small, almost imperceptible ways, as shown repeatedly in our history books. Today it appears to be even more subtle than what was once. The propaganda that propagates polarization among the people, dividing who is ‘right’ from who is ‘wrong’, is very much present and evident in the days we live. After more than one year where most countries declared to be in an emergency state, language, power and logic have been twisted well enough by the media and public institutions (too close to pharmaceutical lobbyists) to induce people to act and behave in a particular manner without giving deadlines or guarantees, and sometimes even lacked logical sustain. This thought brought me back to the famous Anna Hardent quote:

“In an ever-changing, incomprehensible world, the masses had reached the point where they would, at the same time, believe everything and nothing, think that everything was possible and that nothing was true. … Mass propaganda discovered that its audience was ready at all times to believe the worst, no matter how absurd, and did not particularly object to being deceived because it held every statement to be a lie anyhow. The totalitarian mass leaders based their propaganda on the correct psychological assumption that, under such conditions, one could make people believe the most fantastic statements one day and trust that if the next day they were given irrefutable proof of their falsehood, they would take refuge in cynicism; instead of deserting the leaders who had lied to them, they would protest that they had known all along that the statement was a lie and would admire the leaders for their superior tactical cleverness.” Hannah Arendt

It feels like some rights have been used as a carrot in a stick to make us ‘the people’ run for it and having our rights back conditionally on what the state thinks is right to do. At the beginning of 2020 were understandable and justifiable the temporary changes and adaptations citizens had to comply with for the sake of public health security. Still, at present, it seems absurd that we are even debating the right to choose or not to choose to get an ‘emergency approved vaccine.’

Not only media and public institutions managed to drive people to exhaustion at a point where they will do anything to get their fundamental freedoms back (although quite modified), but also they were able to convince society that public institutions and pharmaceutical companies know what is best for you and that their only goal is public safety however at the same time public institutions did not know how/or did not have the competence to manage a health crisis.

How to trust?
These questionable points come from the fact that recently some governments are trying to push directly or mainly indirectly for a mandatory ‘emergency approved vaccine’ against covid-19. Governments don’t want to be held accountable either for their side effects or for their incompetence and mismanagement, and that’s why the push to vaccinate is becoming more and more hardcore. Of course, so far, we see that vaccines help in diminishing hospitalizations, and it is convenient for governments to push for it, but at the same time, why not take the responsibility of administering the vaccine to your population?

Nevertheless, regardless of the potentiality of the vaccine, it is a matter of rights and freedoms. To make it clear, the government is not willing to take responsibility for side effects, but is pushing me to do so by threatening my liberty to go back to ‘normal life’, at the same time they are creating a polarized society by dividing those who vaccinate and those who do not will have different type of freedoms. It is an approach of a questionable authoritarian nature that is being crystalized in the west.

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L'articolo “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others” (George Orwell) proviene da Business.it.

The definition of informality is flexible and it accommodates countries’ situations and needs, especially when it comes to the collection of national statistics. Moreover, it is statistically proven that developing countries tend to have a predominant informality and relatively small modern formal sector. In fact, the estimation made by the International Labor Organization (ILO) is that 66% of the labour force in Latin America work under informal agreements.[5] Further, according to the World Bank data of 2007 one of the countries which has one of the highest incidence of the ‘shadow economy’ is Peru. Peru’s capital city Lima is one of the cities in the region which hosts one of the most vibrant grounds for the informal sector. Within the informal sector OLA Metropolitan Lima estimates that womens’ participation remains higher than men, and suggests that women tend to engage in informal economic activities at a really young age, between 15 and 24. years old. Although in the past decade the Peruvian economy presented steady growth and the rising of employment rates, there are no signs of women’s social mobility from the informal to the formal sector, particularly looking at urban Lima. On the contrary, the number of women entering the informal sector in Lima is growing steadily. Most of these women lack social protection and are vulnerable to the gendered assumptions some scholars argue that women in Lima are ‘forced’ into the informal sector due to the lack of good policies that can empower them in order to break with the paradigm of marianismo and develop social mobility.

While focusing on Latin America, there are two main reasons that drove and still drives people into the informal sector. The first reason, which is approached by Bairoch, concerns the ‘hyper-urbanization’ factor, that is to say the migration of rural population to the urban centers seeking for jobs. The difficulty was that the industries could not completely absorb the upcoming working force; furthermore, the informal sector became “the refuge of those who could not find access to modern employment.” The second reason was argued by the Peruvian economist H. De Soto, who stated that due to the extensive regulations, policies and legal barriers made by the state the informal sector tends to expand, creating a ‘mercantilist’ economic system. In the case of Peru, the growth of informality in the past decade was mainly driven by the second reason. In fact, even though in the past years the Peruvian economy has seen significant economic growth and the opportunity jobs increased, informality still grows especially in the metropolitan Lima, which is a vivid ground for this sector. In 2009 the capital city accounted that 53% of the working population was engaging in informal activities and among these workers two million did not have any social protection.

As argued by H. De Soto; the informal economy is the heart of the Peruvian economy, and it can be argued that the street vendors, including market traders, are at the heart of Lima’s informal economy. Street vendors engage in a range of different activities, either offering street services such as hairdressing, shoe repair and so on, or producing goods at home to sell them in public spaces. More than 210,000 street vendors have occupied the streets of the city center since recorded times of informality. Additionally, attention should be paid to the fact that 2/3 of these street vendors in Lima are women. In 2015, the estimation was that 68% of the street vendors were female working force, and most of them did not have any social protection. In fact, according to the WIEGO report of 2009 the majority of these women were facing what is called ‘tires of informality” that is: they work in the low productivity sector, consequently have very low incomes, they are not registered in the system, consequently do not have access to work-related health insurance, and to social security.

Although from 2004 to 2015 there has been an overall decrease in street vendors in Lima; when looking at the proportions of men and women workers in the activity, the number of female street vendors increased from 298,997 to 310,794 workers during these years. In the light of these data, it is clear that social mobility for these women seems to be stagnated and clearly, there is a key element that plays a role in the shape of this data that is the ‘gender role.’ The culture of ‘machismo’, which displays a gender hierarchy in which the man is seen as more ‘dominant’ and powerful, is really present in all aspects of Latin American society. On the other side of the coin there is the concept of ‘marianismo’, which portrays and gives to the women the ‘feminine’ role, passive, and morally engaged with the caring of the family. Machismo and marianismo are two concepts that are clearly reflecting in the economic system, especially with regards to informality because “the unequal burden of domestic responsibility limits women’s ability to participate fully in the economy.”

In fact, women in Peru spend an average of 40 hours a week on unpaid activities related to household issues. According to M. Maxine, throughout history social policies were never ‘gender-blind’, on the contrary, they “worked with this gendered conceptions of social needs, ones which were familial, patriarchal and paternalistic.” Indeed, the social policies implemented for women are fragile, inefficient and based on assumptions of female economic dependence on men. Moreover, these policies are completely blind to the fact that most of the time women face as care and income providers and they need a stronger social protection system. Henceforth, these women encounter internal pressure from the society to give priorities to household’s activities, due to the paradigms of machismo and marianismo rooted in the culture and also do not encounter assistance from the state in terms of protection or empowerment. In spite of this, the story of Gloria Solorzano is the reflection of how women can empower themselves within informality. She founded the Women’s Network, which organizes women who work as street vendors in Lima and help them in their economic social rights; this organization promotes solidarity and emphasizes gender equality and women’s economic independence.

According to H. De Soto said the government should provide a formal system of ‘good laws ‘which would promote economic efficiency “creating incentives for people to seize the economic opportunities offered by the country and facilitating the specialization of the individual.” Hand in hand with De Soto’s solution, should be added targeted policies for women such as promotion of work-life balance, developing linkages with organizations that already exist, such as the Women’s Network in Lima, invest in affordable childcare, provide a safe environment for children and mothers, financial literacy for access to more capital, efficient healthcare system and access to markets.

[1] Asencio Maritza, “Peru: Women Workers Forced into Informal Economy,” Inter Press Service News Agency, (2009)
[2] Maria Rein, “The Informal Economy and Women in Latin America,” Syracus University Honors Program Capstone Projects 297, (2011):13

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L'articolo Women and informality: the encounter of machismo and marianimso in Peru proviene da Business.it.

Recently, popular shows like Narcos have been taking over the public, some have criticized this kind of tv shows as they gloss over the brutal reality that people live in those situations where narco power is very much present. Sometimes tv shows even romanticise the life of Drug Lords, and emphasize how unreachable they are from authorities. Not only Hollywood but also local productions have become instigators of this controversial topic as they provoke moral dilemmas because of how the narrative of drug trafficking is shown, some say it almost makes the conflicts banal, hiding the brutal reality of ‘normal’ people that live and perpetuating the status quo.

Nevertheless, Narco culture is a phenomenon that is studied by scholars. And an important object of study to understand Mexican culture and society. One of the important and curious aspects of their culture is related to their ‘saints’ and religion.

Religion and Spirituality in Mexico under Narco Culture

Jesus Malverde

The stories around Jesus Malverde, also known as the Saint of the Narcos or “the benevolent criminal,” are varied and it is still unclear what aspects of his life are real and which are the ones invented. It is said that he was born in Sinaloa, possibly under the name Jesus Juarez Mazo, when at the time the dictator Porfrio Diaz was ruling. The story tells that he became a criminal after the death of his parents, which left him into poverty. During his childhood and adolescence he witnessed the rapid socioeconomic transformation of the region, when all the profits of Haciendas were enjoyed by the elite, while the majority of the population were left in great economic poverty. He became a famous criminal, considered to be a type of Robin Hood, as he claimed to be helping people in the name of God, and redistributing his profits to the poor in the late 1800s.
A cult was developed in his name, that unites beliefs and practices of popular Catholicism and other types of superstitions. Also several chapels have been built on his name, although the Catholic Church does not recognize him as a saint. The first church to Jesus Malverde was in Culiacan. His figure generally stands next to other figures such as Santa Muerte. Many miracles, healings and blessings have been attributed to him, thus people today still request his intercession. Nowadays, the tradition of bringing him, in addition to flowers or candles, stones from the place of origin of the devotees, as a way of worshiping.

In the 1970s, drug traffickers adopted Malverde as their ‘patron saint’ as they see themselves in Malverde’s history. Up until a few years ago, Malverde was the most popular icon among drug traffickers in Mexico. However, today, Santa Muerte, considered the “Saint Death”, personifies death and it quickly became a more popular icon of worship. It is a female deity, and folk saint in Mexican folk catholicism. She is associated with healing, protections and safe delivery of the devotees to the after-life. The Catholic Church does not recognize her as a saint as the rites of Santa Muerte are associated with spells that have a more esoteric component.

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L'articolo The ‘Fashionable’ Narco Culture proviene da Business.it.

It is undeniable that the pandemic posed significant challenges to the south American country, which was just coming out of a political and economic turmoil that lasted for almost a decade. Although public education had already given poor results in the years previous to 2020, the remote learning and poor conditions of schools, teachers, and the educational system pushed the levels of lack of primary education rapidly to the edge. Due to restrictive measures, schools had to shut doors throughout Brazil – as in many other countries – for a very long period as one of the measures to contain the disease. Teaching online required a series of adjustments that could not happen overnight. Considering that more than 30% of homes in Brazil do not have access to the internet, which is essential for remote learning – it was impossible to offer excellent and equal education to all students. Apart from the internet issue, there were many cases of students that followed classes through their parent’s smartphones when available.

Remote learning highlighted, even more, the inequality in access to resources, tools and means to get a good education in Brazil. Causing a more significant deficit than we already knew among students in public and private school.

According to the World Bank, 2 out of 3 children may not learn how to read and write properly this year. This study came out in March of 2021, and it analyzed the impact of the pandemic on different educational systems throughout the Latin American region.

Another point issued by the World Bank is a rise to 70% of 10 years old students who are unable to read and understand simple texts. By analyzing these numbers, we find that the loss corresponds to 1.3 years of schooling, which means that a student would have competence and knowledge of more than one grade behind what corresponds to his or her age. Predictions have highlighted that a student can be 1.7 years ‘behind at this paste, which actually corresponds to their age.

This is a crisis with unpredictable outcomes for decades to come. The pandemic put the educational inequality in a magnifying glass for the whole world to see. Those who ‘could not be seen’ or that we did not want to see are now the majority. Now we are paying attention to the numbers that estimate the precarity of Brazilian education and acknowledging the urgency for a more equal and fair system.

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L'articolo The Impact of the Pandemic in Brazilian Education proviene da Business.it.

As long as the country that receives the investments is endowed with well-functioning institutions, protect their national properties – for instance, through fair regulations – and invest the money in human and physical capital in an adequate manner FDI can be a source of long-term economic growth (Pereira and Neves 2011). Brazil and China are two important economies when looking at inflows and outflows of FDI for development due to their recent escalation (Xu 2013). Foreign Direct Investment was severely prohibited in China before 1979 when they gradually start opening for the international market quickly China became the largest recipient of FDI. Whereas in Brazil, FDI started in the early stages after the independence, especially from Western economies, especially Britain (Xu 2013).

These two countries stimulated FDI inflows in two different manners; Brazil attracted FDI through privatization processes during the 70s and lowered regulations. China granted exemptions of taxes and facilitated a gradual entry of foreign investments. The disparity occurred on the distribution of the FDI; Brazil used its FDI to maximize public policies (such as social programs), which were benefiting the society temporarily, the logic: as long as foreign investment enters the country, public policies can continue (Xu 2012). By contrast, China focused its foreign investments inflow in Specific Economic Zones (SEZs), which embodied specific tariffs to attract more capital and technology (Xu 2012).

Moreover, at the beginning of this century, the speed of the Chinese economic growth potentialized their FDI outflows to Brazil on a large scale. Nevertheless, due to the asymmetrical partnership between China and Brazil, the positive trends/ or FDI’s outcomes are gradually disappearing for the South American country. The Chinese government’s incentives for investments in Brazil are mainly concentrated in natural resources- such as mining, extractive and agricultural activities- and are again reinforcing Brazil’s faith in its chronic dependency on commodities (Whalley and Medianu 2012). According to an OECD report released in 1998, there is a clear correlation between Environment and FDI that can offer risks or opportunities, depending on the redistribution of the FDI in the country (Ray 2016). Economists look at FDI invested in the primary sector as a source for new technologies and improvement in structural efficiencies that generates ‘sustainable environmental improvements’.

Nevertheless, to attract FDI, countries abundant in natural resources tend to lower their environmental standards and find themselves in an ‘imperative extractive problem,’ meanwhile consuming polluting goods. This is the case in Brazil. The intensification of FDI from China is of an unprecedented degree. According to the World Bank Data, only in 2009, China’s outward FDI to Brazil jumped at an unprecedented speed: US$116millions (2009), when only one year before (2008) was approximately $40 million (Whalley and Medianu,2012).

According to economic indicators, the increase of FDI inflows in Brazil goes along with the relaxing of environmental regulations. Indeed, the Amazon deforestation rates are significantly associated with the increase of Chinese enterprises financing infrastructure development projects such as roads, railways and agribusiness development (Ray 2016, 229). For instance, Mato Grosso is a federal state in the centre of Brazil and covers part of the south-Amazon region; it is one of the most important regions globally for its agricultural areas and the main producer of soybeans. Recently, Chinese investments have been mainly concentrated in Mato Grosso (Ray 2016, 230). The Chinese demand for soybeans has enhanced and accelerated the production, also causing a dramatic increase in the region’s deforestation (Ray 2016).

Additionally, to the environmental consequences, the revenues earned from the trade of this commodity have been strengthening the Brazilian agribusiness interests in the region. This had profound impacts on domestic politics, which reflected law changes that implied the weakening and relaxing of the environmental regulations. This model of development is a short-term one and is not sustainable since natural resources are finite.

In the current globalizing world, where uncertainty rises, and western hegemony seems to decline, it is essential to understand developmental alternatives without disregarding historical specificities and structural economic problems. The idea of ‘development’ has forced countries to emerge and others to suffer and eventually perish. The analysis of developmental theories applied in different regions shows the failures and successes in the last twenty years. Since the 1970s, the world has witnessed the economic growth of the West, the separation, gradual opening and economic boom of the East and the stagnation of the South. Academic debates on the paths of development have been ongoing since the Second World War, and different schools of thought have disagreed on the most fundamental basis of their theories: the definition of development. As shown by Cardoso and Faletto, there is never going to be an agreed definition of neither ‘development nor of ‘developing country.’ Countries have their historical specificities and structural impediments that are different from each other, and consequently, it is almost impossible to find a standard model for the whole world.

Nevertheless, the academic debate is still relevant because emerging power -BRICs- is coming with alternative paths to develop some of them being more successful. Whereas Brazil pursued a “dependent development”, China went for a neo-statist model, which has been incredibly successful. The relationship between the two BRICs countries: China and Brazil, has been deepening since 2001 and has become a central concern for the long-term development of the South American country. China has framed the relationship as a mutually beneficial and complementary one. Nevertheless, lately due to Brazilian historical specificities and its chronic dependency on commodity exports, some economists are concerned with the nature of the Chinese Brazilian partnership.

The paper defends the idea that this asymmetrical economic relationship is not sustainable in the long run. It has already been an obstacle for the development of the South American country in the past. The Brazilian economy has always been subject to another country’s economic path and success; the so-known ‘colonial relation’ continues to be perpetuated before the West, now the East (China) determines the economic growth of Brazil. By looking at the intensification of Chinese investments in the Brazilian primary sector, the analysis shows stagnation in the expansion of the industry sectors in Brazil.

Additionally, the relaxed environmental Brazilian regulation combined with the intensification of Chinese FDI has been sourcing long-term consequences for the environment (Amazon region). The question is: How can this relation be sustainable if it is based on finite natural resources that are being extensively damaged and exploited? China-Brazil’s economic relation is not a win-win relationship; it is asymmetrical, creating severe consequences for the Brazilian largest share of GDP: commodities.

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L'articolo Chinese FDI vs. Brazilian Development proviene da Business.it.

The idea of the ‘South-South Cooperation’ is indeed the exchange of resources, information and technology between countries from the Global South. An appealing idea for the underdeveloped countries that have found themselves always constrained by institutions guided by the centre/or developed countries. However, the Brazilian fear regarding their economic partnership with China stands on the question: what is the nature of this economic relationship and is it sustainable? Positive viewers of the China-Brazil economic cooperation understands that these two countries complement each other, and consequently, benefit to the same extent. Notwithstanding, many point out to the observation that Brazil is only incrementing its dependency on natural resources. Furthermore, it reproduces the dependency theory in a new framework, with a new centre: China (while in the past, the centre has always been the West).

Economic relations between China and Brazil have been historically sporadic and not of a significant impact overall. However, since China became a full member of the WTO in December 2001, trade relations with the South American country have been consolidating. Overall, from 2000 to 2010, both countries had high trade shares in their GDP while running in trade surpluses. Since 2001, their total trade combined has increased faster than the average world trade (Whalley and Medianu 2012). In those ten years, China’s trade surplus accounted for from US$ 24 billion to US$184 billion (peaked in 2008, with US$297 billion), while Brazil achieved in 2010 US$ 16.5 billion (Whalley and Medianu 2012, 711). Ever since, the impressive Chinese economic growth has resulted in an increasing demand for natural resources, pushing up the prices of commodities. In 2008 with the hit of the global financial crisis, China and Brazil demonstrated to be resistant to the crisis and to have relatively strong macroeconomic stability. Moreover, their bilateral relation was growing and standing despite the economic stagnation of the West; indeed, their trade-relation was increasing so much that the intense Chinese demand for natural resources was able to push up the prices of the commodities in 2008. In 2012 the IMF released a working paper stating that China had become increasingly important in the commodity markets in the past decade because of their increasing need and, consequently, the demand for natural resources (Roache 2012). China now plays a significant role in influencing the world trade and prices of commodities, especially in markets such as metals, agricultural, raw materials and energy markets (Roache 2012).

The decline of western FDI outflows’ supremacy and the collapse of the global financial system in 2008 created the perfect ground for the emergence of a more assertive Chinese presence in Brazil. China filled the FDI’s gaps left by the west (especially by the United States) in 2008, investing in agricultural and extractive sectors in Brazil (Arsel 2016). Economic indicators reflected the deepening of Chinese-Brazilian relations during that year. Indeed, World Bank Data has shown that in 2009 Brazilian total global exports decreased by 22.7%, but their exports to China increased by 23% (Whalley and Medianu 2012). Moreover, CEPAL reports highlighted how much Chinese-Brazilian trade relations have been growing in the past decade: Brazilian exports to China transitioned from US$1.1 billion in 2000 to US$21 billion in 2009, and 78% of those exports were accounted as essential goods, such as soybeans, beef and iron (Baumann 2009). On the other side, imports from China also went up from US$2.1 billion in 2000 to US$15.9billion in 2009 (Baumann 2009). China is now a more critical partner for Brazil than the United States (Whalley and Medianu 2012).

Nevertheless, according to a study made by the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES), these trends of increasing imports from China are already presenting two main disadvantages in the long run for the Brazilian economy (Pereira and Neves 2011). Firstly, these economic indicators, previously mentioned, are confirming a transition from a ‘bilateral’ exchange to an asymmetrical relation between China and Brazil. The intensification of Chinese demands for natural resources is directly expanding Brazilian primary commodity markets. At the same time, China takes advantage of the relaxation of Brazilian environmental regulations and the dependency/or necessity of foreign capital to pursue its development program (Pereira and Neves 2011). The ‘promises’ made to China affect the opportunities for the Brazilian economy to diversify (Devadason 2015). Indeed, the shares of total Brazilian exports of value-added decreased from 58% to 7.8%, and their exports of commodities increased from 41% to 92.2% (Whalley and Medianu 2012). This data analysis completely changes the nature and structure of their partnership. The trade relationship that is now present between China and Brazil is grounded on the theory of comparative advantage, and it is perpetuating the dynamic of centre-periphery economic relations, reinforcing Cardoso’s dependency theory.

Furthermore, the Brazilian economy is persisting in pursuing development through short-term solutions like Chinese FDI and exporting commodities. A second problem identified by the BNDES shows that if Brazil continues through this dependency path, the country will industrialize at a slower pace. The competitiveness for its product abroad in the future will be extremely low (Whalley and Medianu 2012). Additionally to this problem, the environmental consequences due to the intensification of the Brazilian primary sector will be irreversible. It is already affecting the main revenue of the country: natural resources. The leading cause of these negative projections upon the environment is the intensive inflow of Chinese FDI, which only benefits agribusiness and big Brazilian infrastructure firms. It has been proved that China’s increasing presence in those sectors is recognized as one of the significant drivers of deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon region. Environmentalists and sociologists are always more concerned with this Brazilian short-term development strategy.

In this framework, the countries “complement” each other by giving Brazil and natural resources stability to China. However, the relationship is asymmetric because it entails a periphery-centre relation that lacks future sustainability. The last decade of Brazilian economic growth has been attached to a specific Chinese development phase that demanded natural resources. Whereas Brazil continues to fall in its dependency on excessively commodities-export, China moves its economy to industrialization and production of manufactures.

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L'articolo China and Brazil: Asymmetrical or Bilateral Economic Relation? proviene da Business.it.

Furthermore, there is no universally accepted definition nor for the term ‘economic development’ or ‘developing country.’ Historically, different theories have worked with different definitions, and have proposed different mechanisms and processes to achieve economic development. Although the literatures diverge in the understanding of the processes for the economic development of a country, it is possible to trace a simple and shared outline among the literature for ‘economic development’ that is: the transition of a low income country into a modernized economy. (Harvey 2005; Cardoso 1979; Ravenhill 2017; Kohli 2009).

Moreover, the broader literature on development studies tend to divide the world in two big economic globs, that they claim to share more or less same economic features: ‘the Global North’ as ‘developed,’ and the Global South as ‘underdeveloped/or developing.’ (McMichael 2012; Ravenhill 2017; Cardoso 1979).

The focus of the analysis of the literature is particularly concerned on the countries of the Global South, and in a broader analysis on how they have experienced and experience today their chosen developmental paths. In times of change, such as the 1970s key debates have emerged between school of thoughts; the first being ‘neoliberal development model/or modernization theory’ based on neoclassical economics; the reflection of this model in practice in the global south correspond to the SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programs) given by the Washington Consensus .The second one being the ‘neo-statist development model,’ based on a notion of developmental state, and its reflection today in the global South is the so called ‘Beijing Consensus’. Further, between these two thoughts an important book analysed in this review is Cardoso’s Dependency and Development in Latin America; which gives another perspective on the neo-liberal developmental model. The literatures are going to be reviewed in the chronological way presented.

In the 1970s the neo-liberal economy came to define the global developmental policy agenda of almost all underdeveloped countries (Ravenhill 2017; Harvey 2005). According to Harvey, neoliberal economics became incorporated in the way people interpret life, and develop since then (Harvey 2005). The core concept of the neoliberal ideology for having economic growth and furthermore develop, is the maximization of markets’ efficiency through the acquisition of technology that can bring information (knowledge) and development (Harvey 2005). Moreover, the way neoliberal economists understand development is that it is itself a synonym of economic growth, and further can be achieved only ‘through the liberation of entrepreneurial freedoms within an environment in which property rights are protected, there is free market, free trade and no state intervention in the economy’ (Harvey 2005; Ravenhill 2017; McMichael 2012). The profound cynicism towards states comes from the idea that since individuals are competitive and behave according to their self-interests so do politicians, furthermore, the presence of the state in the economy distorts growth (Harvey 2012, 5; McMichael 2015).

Moreover, the redistribution of wealth is top-down, and the state is no longer important under a context of ‘trickle-down economics’ (McMichael 2015; Harvey 2005). In other words, the neoliberal theory understands development as a national process by removing obstacles, such as the government interventions, for free market capitalism. The ‘Washington Consensus’ was the practical result of the neoliberal theories being enforced in developing countries, in particular South America during the so called ‘Lost Decade’ in the 1980s (Ravenhill 2017). However, according to Cardoso and Faletto the reproduction of these neoliberal dynamics has been reinforcing historical structural impediments for development (Cardoso and Faletto 1979 ; Kohli 2009). Cardoso specified that development is not just about a national process, because these underdeveloped nations are often tied to the present economic international dynamics (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, 20 ).

The most prominent model/theories that challenged the neo-liberal development model came indeed from Latin America. Economists such as Cardoso, Faletto, and Prebish were the pioneers in explaining the failures of the neo-liberal model in the Global South. Their main argument was that the obstacles for industrialization in developing countries were grounded in the complex built structure of the global system. Development through the liberalization of the economy is not just merely a national concern but it is deeply shaped by the type of economic international dynamics that are in place (Love 1980; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). They argue that these dynamics are rooted in economic exchanges between ‘peripheral economies’ and ‘center economies’ (Cardoso and Faletto 1979).

By peripheries are intended those countries that mainly export commodities and by centers those modern/industrialized economies that export value added goods to the peripheries (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). This economic relation/or exchange has been described by many Neo-Marxists as a type of ‘colonial relation.’ Peripheries try to develop/industrialize and reinforce their domestic economy through the revenues of non-value added goods (commodities), and in the meantime import from the centers value added goods (Cardoso and Faletto 1979) . Moreover, J. Love adds that this relation works systematically in favor of the centers and in disadvantages of the peripheries because the ratio price of exports in underdeveloped countries are unable to generate levels of income capable to develop their economy and to move to more diversified and industrial sectors (Love 1980). Furthermore, the authors consider that a totality of historical specificities, such as colonialism combined with structural problems (market based on commodity-exports) in an underdeveloped country are preventing its development.

The combination of these thoughts came to be known as the “dependency theory,” where peripheries try to develop by the expanding and development of the centers (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Love 1980). These authors understand that in order for an underdeveloped country to pursue development it needs to break these structural impediments, freeing itself from the dependency on primary sectors ( Love 1980; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). By contrast, the successful development of certain Asian countries was based on the Neo-Statist model of development.

Their model’s success exemplifies the divergence of economic performance between Asia and Latin America (Kohli 2009). Neo-statist development model has become a compromise between the neo-liberal model of development and a stronger sense of nationalism (Kohli 2009). The model incorporates neoliberal ideas, such as the understanding of the importance of the markets tied to an open economy; and that economic growth is inevitable in order to develop.

Moreover, the shared ideas with the neoliberal theory of development are two: both of them understand development as economic growth, and both of them see development as a national process- contrary to Cardoso’s dependency theory- (Kwok-wah 2012; Ravenhill 2017; Kohli 2009, ). Nevertheless, neo-statist model differentiates from the neoliberal in the understanding of the relationship between state and markets (Ravenhill 2017). “Markets need to be governed rather than to be free” (Ravenhill 2017,362). Indeed, the model is grounded on laws and regulations and a well-functioning administrative power that can conduct macroeconomic regulations (Kwok-wah 2012). In today’s world China is the best case to exemplify neo-statist development. Additionally, Kohli suggests that the relative autonomy from global institutions that countries such as China gained was the main driver for their economic success (Kohli 2009).

Most of Asian countries broke free from the ‘western neoliberal way of development,’ and advanced their own model according to the economic needs of the region.T0day ,the world looks at the success of the Neo-statist theory as an alternative path (Kwok-wah 2012). Harvey and neoliberal development theories promoters perceive the success of the Asian economies as a miracle: “The East Asian Miracle,” and emphasize that the economic growth of the region has been mainly rooted in their opening to the world economy rather than in the benefits of the state’s presence. Kwok-wah and Kohli do not deny the benefits given by the Neo-liberal ideas, but emphasize that the gradual economic opening of China and the state as regulator of the markets were the drivers for the divergence of economic success compared to Latin America (Harvey 2005; Kwok-wah 2012).

The purpose of this review was to expose the developmental trends that have applied in different regions after the Second World War. The academic debate is relevant because it is still an ongoing discussion particularly among underdeveloped countries. The neoliberal model has been the hegemonic theory since the 1970s, advocating for underdeveloped countries to develop by emulating those countries already developed (Washington Consensus in Latin America) . Cardoso, Faletto, Kohli and Prebish criticize the flows of the neo-liberal theory of development by stating that the model is only perpetuating an asymmetrical economic relation between peripheries and centers, which is blocking those underdeveloped countries from industrialize and further develop . Kwok-wah, Kohli, Ravenhill present what has been called the Neo-statist development as an alternative for development, which incorporates the state as regulator of the markets within an open economy.

The emphasis is on the recent success of Asian economies that adopted that model, particularly China. Indeed China has become the symbol of Neo-statism success, academics and economists talk about the ‘Beijing Consensus’ /or Chinese capitalism contrasting the relative failure of the ‘Washington Consensus’ in Latin America. It is important to conduct further research on the Neo-statist model to understand its chances of applicability in other regions.

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L'articolo A review on Strategies for Economic Development for the Global South proviene da Business.it.

“It is harder to maintain the balance of freedom than it is to endure the weight of tyranny” – Simon Bolivar

The controversial story of Francisco de Paula Santander and Simon Bolivar who shared the dream of a free and independent America. They went through numerous battles together and achieved the independence of New Granda on the 7th of August in 1819.

A confederation of nations was born that today comprises Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador, known as Gran Colombia. In 1821, the Congress of Cucuta declared Simon Bolivar president and Santander vice president. However, Bolivar left Gran Colombia to complete his expedition; he thought that all Spanish had to be expelled from the region to avoid any attempt of insurgence to regain power. The departure of Bolivar implied that Santander would take a significant role in governing the just liberated territory. To summarize, while Bolivar liberated, Santander was trying to organize the newly liberated regions.

Santander aimed at improving the economic situation as the region was highly impoverished by the wars. He promoted industry, agriculture, mining and education. Nevertheless, at the same time, Bolivar was demanding financial support from Santander to continue with his expeditions, but getting resources from people was not an easy task, and tensions between the two began to rise.

In addition to the tension caused by the support of the independence campaign, different ideas about the future of the confederation divided these two great men. While Bolivar had the idea of a great nation organized from the centre under the command of a president for life, Santander envisioned a federalist nation where both president and militaries had limits to their powers. The iconic quote by Francisco de Paula Santander in the Congress of the Republic of Colombia exemplifies his idea for the region “Arms have given you independence, laws will give you freedom.”

The vision of Bolivar has been understood as unviable by many historians. The wars economically broke Gran Colombia, and a great part of the population lacked primary education. Although the land was rich in products, there were no infrastructures or means to export or promote them as Bolivar envisioned.

In addition, general Antonio Paez in Venezuela and the Ecuadorian Juan Jose Flores were not satisfied with the way Santander was handling the economies in Santafe de Bogota. Commanders of the respective territories wanted to maintain power in the regions and promote their vision of how their countries should develop further. Bolivar’s vision was continental, while Santander, Paez and Flores pushed for a more regional model. In any case, neither the central nor the federalist model would have worked.

In the last day of his life, Simon Bolivar wrote “Not having solved our differences with Santander has hurt us all.”

The story of the relationship between Francisco De Paula Santander and Simon Bolivar transcends history. The duality has marked the continent until today in a very sublime way. The dilemma has remained for us to solve, where to trace the line between freedoms and order. Sometimes the freedoms are exceeded, but also the excess of laws slows the advance of the societies.

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L'articolo Francisco de Paula Santander and Simón Bolívar: order and freedom proviene da Business.it.

Furthermore, there is no universally accepted definition nor for the term ‘economic development’ or ‘developing country.’ Historically, different theories have worked with different definitions, and have proposed different mechanisms and processes to achieve economic development. Although the literatures diverge in the understanding of the processes for the economic development of a country, it is possible to trace a simple and shared outline among the literature for ‘economic development’ that is: the transition of a low income country into a modernized economy. (Harvey 2005; Cardoso 1979; Ravenhill 2017; Kohli 2009).

Moreover, the broader literature on development studies tend to divide the world in two big economic globs, that they claim to share more or less same economic features: ‘the Global North’ as ‘developed,’and the Global South as ‘underdeveloped/or developing.’ (McMichael 2012; Ravenhill 2017; Cardoso 1979). The focus of the analysis of the literature is particularly concerned on the countries of the Global South, and in a broader analysis on how they have experienced and experience today their chosen developmental paths. In times of change, such as the 1970s key debates have emerged between school of thoughts; the first being ‘neoliberal development model/or modernization theory’ based on neoclassical economics; the reflection of this model in practice in the global south correspond to the SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programs) given by the Washington Consensus .The second one being the ‘neo-statist development model,’ based on a notion of developmental state, and its reflection today in the global South is the so called ‘Beijing Consensus’. Further, between these two thoughts an important book analysed in this review is Cardoso’s Dependency and Development in Latin America; which gives another perspective on the neo-liberal developmental model. The literatures are going to be reviewed in the chronological way presented.

In the 1970s the neo-liberal economy came to define the global developmental policy agenda of almost all underdeveloped countries (Ravenhill 2017; Harvey 2005). According to Harvey, neoliberal economics became incorporated in the way people interpret life, and develop since then (Harvey 2005). The core concept of the neoliberal ideology for having economic growth and furthermore develop, is the maximization of markets’ efficiency through the acquisition of technology that can bring information (knowledge) and development (Harvey 2005). Moreover, the way neoliberal economists understand development is that it is itself a synonym of economic growth, and further can be achieved only ‘through the liberation of entrepreneurial freedoms within an environment in which property rights are protected, there is free market, free trade and no state intervention in the economy’ (Harvey 2005; Ravenhill 2017; McMichael 2012). The profound cynicism towards states comes from the idea that since individuals are competitive and behave according to their self-interests so do politicians, furthermore, the presence of the state in the economy distorts growth (Harvey 2012, 5; McMichael 2015).

Moreover, the redistribution of wealth is top-down, and the state is no longer important under a context of ‘trickle-down economics’ (McMichael 2015; Harvey 2005). In other words, the neoliberal theory understands development as a national process by removing obstacles, such as the government interventions, for free market capitalism. The ‘Washington Consensus’ was the practical result of the neoliberal theories being enforced in developing countries, in particular South America during the so called ‘Lost Decade’ in the 1980s (Ravenhill 2017).

However, according to Cardoso and Faletto the reproduction of these neoliberal dynamics has been reinforcing historical structural impediments for development (Cardoso and Faletto 1979 ; Kohli 2009). Cardoso specified that development is not just about a national process, because these underdeveloped nations are often tied to the present economic international dynamics (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, 20 ).The most prominent model/theories that challenged the neo-liberal development model came indeed from Latin America. Economists such as Cardoso, Faletto, and Prebish were the pioneers in explaining the failures of the neo-liberal model in the Global South. Their main argument was that the obstacles for industrialization in developing countries were grounded in the complex built structure of the global system.

Development through the liberalization of the economy is not just merely a national concern but it is deeply shaped by the type of economic international dynamics that are in place (Love 1980; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). They argue that, these dynamics are rooted in economic exchanges between ‘peripheral economies’ and ‘center economies’ (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). By peripheries are intended those countries that mainly export commodities and by centers those modern/industrialized economies that export value added goods to the peripheries (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). This economic relation/or exchange has been described by many Neo-marxists as a type of ‘colonial relation.’

Peripheries try to develop/industrialize and reinforce their domestic economy through the revenues of non-value added goods (commodities), and in the meantime import from the centers value added goods (Cardoso and Faletto 1979) . Moreover, J. Love adds that this relation works systematically in favor of the centers and in disadvantages of the peripheries because the ratio price of exports in underdeveloped countries are unable to generate levels of income capable to develop their economy and to move to more diversified and industrial sectors (Love 1980). Furthermore, the authors consider that a totality of historical specificities, such as colonialism combined with structural problems (market based on commodity-exports) in an underdeveloped country are preventing its development.

The combination of these thoughts came to be known as the “dependency theory,” where peripheries try to develop by the expanding and development of the centers (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Love 1980). These authors understand that in order for an underdeveloped country to pursue development it needs to break these structural impediments, freeing itself from the dependency on primary sectors ( Love 1980; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). By contrast, the successful development of certain Asian countries was based on the Neo-Statist model of development. Their model’s success exemplifies the divergence of economic performance between Asia and Latin America (Kohli 2009). Neo-statist development model has become a compromise between the neo-liberal model of development and a stronger sense of nationalism (Kohli 2009). The model incorporates neoliberal ideas, such as the understanding of the importance of the markets tied to an open economy; and that economic growth is inevitable in order to develop.

Moreover, the shared ideas with the neoliberal theory of development are two: both of them understand development as economic growth, and both of them see development as a national process- contrary to Cardoso’s dependency theory- (Kwok-wah 2012; Ravenhill 2017; Kohli 2009, ). Nevertheless, neo-statist model differentiates from the neoliberal in the understanding of the relationship between state and markets (Ravenhill 2017). “Markets need to be governed rather than to be free” (Ravenhill 2017,362). Indeed, the model is grounded on laws and regulations and a well-functioning administrative power that can conduct macroeconomic regulations (Kwok-wah 2012). In today’s world China is the best case to exemplify neo-statist development. Additionally, Kohli suggests that the relative autonomy from global institutions that countries such as China gained was the main driver for their economic success (Kohli 2009). Most of Asian countries breaked free from the ‘western neoliberal way of development,’ and advanced their own model according to the economic needs of the region.T0day ,the world looks at the success of the Neo-statist theory as an alternative path (Kwok-wah 2012). Harvey and neoliberal development theories promoters perceive the success of the Asian economies as a miracle: “The East Asian Miracle,” and emphasize that the economic growth of the region has been mainly rooted in their opening to the world economy rather than in the benefits of the state’s presence. Kwok-wah and Kohli do not deny the benefits given by the Neo-liberal ideas, but emphasize that the gradual economic opening of China and the state as regulator of the markets were the drivers for the divergence of economic success compared to Latin America (Harvey 2005; Kwok-wah 2012).

The purpose of this review was to expose the developmental trends that have applied in different regions after the Second World War. The academic debate is relevant because it is still an ongoing discussion particularly among underdeveloped countries. The neoliberal model has been the hegemonic theory since the 1970s, advocating for underdeveloped countries to develop by emulating those countries already developed (Washington Consensus in Latin America) . Cardoso, Faletto, Kohli and Prebish criticize the flows of the neo-liberal theory of development by stating that the model is only perpetuating an asymmetrical economic relation between peripheries and centers, which is blocking those underdeveloped countries from industrialize and further develop . Kwok-wah, Kohli, Ravenhill present what has been called the Neo-statist development as an alternative for development, which incorporates the state as regulator of the markets within an open economy. The emphasis is on the recent success of Asian economies that adopte that model, particularly China. Indeed China has become the symbol of Neo-statism success, academics and economists talk about the ‘Beijing Consensus’ /or Chinese capitalism contrasting the relative failure of the ‘Washington Consensus’ in Latin America. It is important to conduct further research on the Neo-statist model to understand its chances of applicability in other regions.

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L'articolo A review on Strategies for Economic Development for the Global South proviene da Business.it.

The path that led to the coup can be traced with the inauguration of João Goulart known as “Jango” in 1961. There were various obstacles to the inauguration of Jago as president because of his close relationships with labour unions. Conservative groups viewed him with suspicion often accusing him of being a ‘communist’. The political crisis of the Jango government was also strengthened by reforms that were advocated by the government – the Basic Reforms. Among the basic reforms the most advanced was the agrarian reform which fostered an enormous national debate in March 1963 that clearly polarized opinions. Groups of peasant workers were formed who began to invade rural properties and pressure the government to carry out the reform – even if by force. The landowners, in turn, were against agrarian reform.

The Agrarian Reform proposed by Goulart’s government consisted in promoting land democratization, while extending the main rights of rural workers. For instance, there was a decree that provided for the expropriation of unexplored or exploited rural areas contrary to the social function of the property, located on the margins of the federal road and rail axes and the lands benefited or recovered by Union investments in irrigation, drainage and water works. However, the implementation of land reform required a constitutional change since the government intended that indemnities to owners be paid with government bonds, while the Constitution provided for compensation paid in advance and in cash.

Moreover, there were other reforms proposed by this pack of ‘basic reforms,’ including an educational, fiscal, electoral, and banking reform.

Other two actions by the Jango government increased this opposition from the American government, which started to finance the coup movements in Brazil. The first action was the Profit Remittances Act of 1962, which prevented multinationals from sending more than 10% of their profits abroad. The second measure that Americans strongly disagreed with was the continuity of Brazil’s independent foreign policy and practiced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, San Tiago Dantas.

As a result, from 1962 the United States began to actively finance conservative groups and politicians in Brazil. Two groups that received ample American funding became known as the “Ipes-Ibad complex”, with Ipes being the Institute for Research and Social Studies, and Ibad, the Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action. Ibad, in fact, was the target of a CPI in 1962 because it received millions from the American government to finance the campaign of more than 800 politicians during that year’s elections. The supported politicians were conservative politicians, and the goal was to create a parliamentary front that would bar the government of João Goulart in all ways. According to Brazilian legislation at the time, this type of financing was illegal.

The destabilization of the Jango government was also largely carried out by the Brazilian press. The newspapers of great circulation in Brazil joined in a coup articulation that received the ironic name of Rede da Democracia (Democracy Network).

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The first sub-section exposes Beauvoir’s understanding of the origins of women’s condition of oppression to identify and criticize the dominant western view on women’s self-identity. Hence, it is aligned with the theories proposed by Simone de Beauvoir in her book “The Second Sex.” The second sub-section clarifies the notion of Hegel’s dialectical, which is crucial to understanding Beauvoir’s conceptualization of women’s identity
Women’s conceptualization of their identity.

Simone de Beauvoir exposed the situation of women’s oppression and women’s condition of ‘otherness’ throughout her works and she influenced many contemporary feminist activists, philosophers, and theorists. Her disruptive declaration: “He is a subject, he is the Absolute – she is the other,” clearly states her vision on the condition of women. To be the ‘other’ means to be a non-subject, non-person; the identity of the ‘other’ forcefully convey its essentialization to a mere physical body, and this condition produces an alienated self.

This identity, which has been constructed in binary opposition to men’s identity, has served the purposes of women’s oppression. And “the true problem for a woman is to reject these flights from reality and seek self-fulfilment in transcendence.” In general, feminist theories agree that human actions that, throughout time, became social norms have maintained and reproduced the condition of women as the ‘other.’ And men, who have historically held power and dominance in society, have given these social norms and placed the roles of each gender. By doing so, the man identifies himself with a non-corporeal reality (transcendental, rational, soul) and place the woman as the other. In order to explain the origins of the oppression and her idea of ‘other,’ Simone de Beauvoir derives the ‘self – other’ problem from Hegel’s dialectical relationship of master and slave.

Origins of Oppression: Hegel’s Dialectical and ‘The Second Sex.’

The Hegelian notion of the self embraces the idea that the subject can define its identity only in relation to other subjects. Therefore, achieving self-consciousness about one’s own identity is a process of dialectical transformation towards transcendence. Hegel’s dialectical of master and slave relationship describes an ontological situation where the slave – identified as the dependent and oppressed identity – comes to comprehend his own identity as an independent person by overcoming and transcending his fear; while the master realizes its dependency on the slave.

There are two essential points from Hegel’s dialectic from which Simone de Beauvoir traces her conceptualization of a gendered-other. Firstly, Hegel emphasizes the idea that a subject needs recognition of another human being in order to state its identity and its value, thus since men cannot live in isolation, they assert themselves as essential and set up the other as inessential. Secondly, only by transcending fear, there is the chance of freedom for the ‘other.’ Nevertheless, Simone de Beauvoir recognizes that male-female relationship is somehow different from the slave – master relationship because the privileges and protections given by men’s domination mitigate women’s’ oppression and leave them with their identity tangled with their physical body. This means that women have never played this game of recognition, thus there are neither slaves nor masters they are just the ‘other’. Because Hegel’s dialectic assumes that “reciprocity exists between free beings.” Therefore, it is concluded that the reason why “women cannot engage themselves in the process of recognition is because of gender.”

Immanence and Transcendence

The concepts of immanence and transcendence, present in The Second Sex, expand on the idea of the origins of oppression of women. The term transcendence presents an active, creative mode of existence free from biological constraints. While immanence implies a passive and uncreative mode of existence necessary to survive normally biologically constrained. Judith Butler describes this situation as the “masculine disembodiment and feminine enslavement to the body.” Where women are placed to immanence and men are prone to transcendence.” Additionally, Western philosophy has associated and celebrated women’s nature and women’s lives with the physical body, and body’s functions. And differences and similarities between mind and body are tied with how philosophers, have tended to discuss freedom, knowledge, and reality (1982, 110). Feminist theories have often fought and rejected this fixed idea. Indeed, Beauvoir proposes that immanence and transcendence together are inseparable and fundamental aspects of a human being. As a result, the feminist conclusion is that women should liberate themselves, from the imposed ‘self’ and creates their own understanding of themselves. The basic idea of the feminist identity and the feminist cause is to transform women conceptualization of self from object to subject by challenging power-arrangements that assigned fixed roles to women.

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Moreover, the import tax on firearms was abolished under his presidency, facilitating even more access to guns. When discussing gun laws in Brazil, it is essential to mention that the country has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. After two years of his presidency and his decree to expand the population’s armament, the country has 1.151 million legal weapons in the hands of citizens, considering that in December 2018, there were only 697 thousand. Additionally, the most significant increase of 72% is about individual’s licenses which went from 346 thousand firearms in 2018 to 595 thousand at the end of 2020. Another relevant data is that in 2018 Atlas of Violence published a report stating that between the early 1980s and 2016, the percentage of homicides committed with firearms rose from 40% to 70% in the country.

These high percentages highlight the urgency and importance of the matter in the country. It is crucial to improve and take action on the kind of gun laws and decrees are being issued in the country to start a change in the statistics of lethal violence. When discussing public security, arm-control is essential to guarantee freedoms. In a democratic state, where the rule of law is respected, the monopoly of weapons is in the state’s hands to ensure public security to its citizens. When we start easing citizens’ access to firearms with the justification that they should protect themselves, we are dangerously outsourcing public security responsibility to the general public.

According to Harvard professor of public health David Hemenway having a gun for self-defence does not reduce the chances of being injured. Several studies show that the risk of having a gun at home outweigh the benefits. Indeed, most of the time, the risks are fatal accidents, suicides, and intimidation to family members, where women and children are often the victims. Not enough attention was paid by international and national media on these new decrees as we are currently dealing with covid-19, which has brought to light other structural problems in the country.

Nevertheless, it is essential to pay attention to how Brazil deals with its public security’s issues, as it is a dear topic to Brazilian citizens. We can indeed recall that public safety was a crucial topic during the last presidential campaign, and gun laws were a source of great polarization.

Considering that the current economic and political crisis will further escalate in the near future would be better to pay attention to shady decisions that are being taken while everyone pays attention to the health crisis caused by the pandemic.

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In emergency situations arising from, among other causes, civil war, famine, or genocide, humanitarian interference has been increasingly considered by the international community as the moral option for alleviating the catastrophic situation of a population suffering from the systematic oppression of its State. Yet, repeatedly throughout history we have seen that such “humanitarian intervention”, even if well intentioned, is never exempt from running the risk of increasing the humanitarian catastrophe in the intervened country. For example, in March 2011, the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama authorized a military intervention in Libya with the intentions of saving the lives of democratic civilians who protested as they were being constantly attacked by the dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi. Gaddafi did not only threaten the momentum of the crescent Arab Spring, which had in recent past demolished authoritarian regimes in both Egypt and Tunisia, but also the lives of the protestors of the city where the revolt had sparked (Kuperman 2015). However, after reexamining the aftermath of such advised intervention, it is concluded that Obama’s military operation in Libya was a wretched fiasco according to its own guidelines (Kuperman 2015). Libya did not only fell short to progress into a democracy: it declined into a failed State. Gross human rights violations have augmented significantly. Instead of assisting the U.S. fight against terrorism, just like Gaddafi had done throughout his last 10 years of rule, Libya started to operate as a territorial hub for militants aligned with ISIL and al Qaeda. Moreover, such intervention also undermined the interests of the U.S., as it threatened the nuclear nonproliferation deal, and increased tensions in Syria’s civil war (Kuperman 2015, 67).

In such manner, given the great risks that a humanitarian intervention poses for both the intervened and interventionist States, the political debate regarding humanitarian intervention has not yet come to an agreement. Even when appealing to the criteria of humanity and respect for the most fundamental rights, international humanitarian law cannot be invoked to justify an armed intervention given its already known unpredictable and potential disastrous consequences.

Armed humanitarian intervention was not a legitimate practice during the Cold War because States gave more value to national sovereignty and order than to the fulfillment of Human Rights. There was a significant change in attitudes during the 1990s, especially among the liberal democratic States, which paved the way for pressing new humanitarian claims within the international society (Bellamy and Wheeler 2008). The paradigm shift of the 90s period is characterized for the increasing emphasis that the international community advanced with regards to the concept of human security. That is to say, to the protection and safeguarding of the right to life and personal integrity, and the integration of values, rights and human capabilities in all systems of international, national and local security (Kapuy 2004). The novelty in this sense is that the defense of such human security stopped being only in the responsibilities of each respective government, as it also started to be considered part of the entire international community’s task, even to the ironic point where the international community could take an armed action against a State to defend such State. This in turn was to affect the principle of national sovereignty understood from the point of view of the Westphalian peace of 1648, through which the European States, independent and with the same rank, created a community absent of supreme authority, and shielded themselves from any external interference.However, the UN’s mechanism to decide over humanitarian intervention should not be considered by disregarding the presence of the discriminating veto mechanism in the Security council, which gives the power to any of the p-5 nations (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; plus Germany) to halt a decision involving humanitarian intervention. Such veto power predominates even when the majority of the member States would otherwise agree to a humanitarian intervention. In this manner, the full implementation of the principle responsibility to protect by the UN Security Council is implausible to come. Without a serious reform to such discriminatory decision-making system with foundations on the veto power of the p-5, the timely and decisive action that the United Nations Security Council should conduct on matters of humanitarian crises is unlikely to appear (Kwon Ho 2011, 209).In his 2005 report: “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All”, the Secretary General of the UN supported the need to move towards the goal of assuming the “responsibility to protect” concept advanced by the 2001 report issued by the ICISS. For that, he proposed that, to authorize the use of force in general, a list of criteria should be applied, including the seriousness of the threat, proportionality and possibility of success. For their part, the heads of State and government, in the final document of the World Summit of that same year, decided to accept such proposal. It even seemed that in such document, the heads of State raised the responsibility to protect to the range of obligation. This is because on the one hand, the document required the States to protect their population from genocide, war crimes, purification ethnicity and crimes against humanity. On the other hand, in the case that the States were not able to protect their population from such violations, the responsibility of the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other appropriate peaceful means—through the United Nations and in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter—to help protect to populations of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity would predominate (Arredondo 2014, 273). The exercise of such responsibility for protecting an oppressed civilian population against serious, massive and systematic violations of their human rights, entails that States declare themselves willing (and not obliged) to carry forward in each concrete case an eventual collective action through the UN Security Council. This eventual collective action could only take place if peaceful means result inadequate and there is evidence that national authorities are not complying with the obligation to protect its population (Arredondo 2014, 273). In this sense, the exercise of the “Responsibility to Protect” act implies that the international community must be willing to take measures collectively in a timely and decisive manner.

If we were to apply a conceptualization of sovereignty to the UN’s Security Council political body, Althusius’ principle of subsidiarity and of shared sovereignty, which is adverse to any type of authoritarian regime, would definitely not apply. A UN’s Security Council that would share its sovereignty, would instead be fundamentally democratic, given that it would recognize the willingness of all member-states to engage in the world’s “integral symbiotic community” decisions. Such a Security Council envisioned in the document of the World Summit of 2005, is in need therefore of replacing the discriminatory veto power mechanism to one which allows all the member-states “decide by themselves and for themselves”.

L'articolo The responsibility to protect proviene da Business.it.

In academia, discussions sparked on how to report the new features of this new wave. The topic is relevant since ongoing academic debates are in place to trace a line and to give a definition for the new rise of populism that these administrations of the 21st century have enhanced in the past two decades, creating disagreements when scholars need to ‘classify’ the politicians in the region.An interesting case is the one of the former president of Brazil, Lula Inacio da Silva, who appears in the literature to be a controversial figure. To what extent was Lula a populist leader within the period of the Pink Tide? Moreover, there is a divergence in the reviewed literature with regards to the reason for the upsurge of these new governments. Some attribute the rise of the ‘Pink Tide’ to the role played by external economic conditions during the early 2000s, the so-called ‘commodities boom years.’ These economic conditions enhance the possibility for the new governments to pursue nationalists, redistributive, and ‘populist’ political projects and discourses.

The reviewed literature analyses the case study of Brazil during Lula’s administration since his victory in the elections of 2002. Some authors, such as Alfred Saad Filho and Philip Arestis focused on the argument that the ‘social sensibility’ that Lula created throughout his discourses somehow put him in the category of populism (which is not necessarily the case). And that these features are not enough to classify him in the ‘Left-Turn’ of the 21st century. Further, authors on the same line argue that Lula needed to build up this solidarity and trust to continue with neoliberal policies of the previous government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso covered by his ‘populist discourses,’ in a pragmatic way of doing politics classifying Lula in the ‘Third Way’ position adding a new concept known as ‘passive revolution.’With regards to Lula’s administration, the reviewed literature analyzed presents different mainstreams for the classification of Lula’s government as populist. Debates have been sparked before and during his mandates on what kind of populism or left approach he was taking to govern the country (Saad-Filho 2007). Some literature perceived Lula and his government as a left-populist and perfectly matching with the ‘Pink Tide’ phenomenon, others have seen him as a ‘third-way’ politician who was able to enhance a ‘passive revolution’ in the country. Lula Inacio da Silva run for the presidency of Brazil in 1989 and 1994 with no success.

Many argue that the majority – especially the middle class- was perceiving him as a leader of a radicalized left, mainly because of his discourses which were covering only the concerns of the lower class (Chodor 2014). However, in the fourth election after the military dictatorship that was established in Brazil, Lula Inacio da Silva came to office in 2002. To win the elections Lula understood that his discourse which mainly approached the lower class needed to change to a more inclusive one. The middle class was mainly following and supporting the neoliberal candidates, and Lula had to avoid the construction of antagonism between ‘the masses’ and the elite’, he needed to amplify his electorate by giving a more inclusive discourse. Indeed, he wrote a letter during the campaign ‘Carta ao Povo Brasileiro’ (Letter to the Brazilian People), where he presented a commitment to the free markets to the business community and guaranteed the neoliberal policies that were in place, at the same time he codified his ‘social-solidarity’ to the masses (Grigera; Saad-Filho 2007). Lula’s discourse combined a tone of solidarity and undergrounded commitment to neoliberal policies, and clearly the abandonment of an antagonist discourse (Saad-Filho 2007). Furthermore, in the view of some academic literature, according to given characteristics of populism, the former Brazilian president since the beginning of his mandate could not be classified as a populist leader as was for instance Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.Indeed, there were not ‘anti-elite’, anti-globalization nor ‘anti-imperialist’ rhetoric, this branch of literature understands that those who classify Lula as populist are basing their conviction on the fact that Lula had strong charismatic appeals ‘to the people.’ Although these authors, do not frame Lula as the classical populist leader, they agree on two main elements that could be used to identify the leader as one of the Pink Tide. Firstly, the institutionalization of some social demands, secondly the redistribution of wealth through social programs –such as Conditional Cash Transfers(CCTs).

However, Alfredo Saad Filho and Philip Artesis argue that improving the living conditions of those disadvantaged and empower specific sectors of the society are not enough conditions to identify government as ‘populist,’ nor to classify it on the ‘Pink Tide. Further, the following studies have documented that Lula did not change the conservative ways of Brazilian politics, his speeches to the masses and his personal history were sensitive and efficient to win the office but his macroeconomic policies were not really different from the ones of the previous government (Saad-Filho 2007; Petras 2006). The authors acknowledge that his administration has indeed been more generous with the low-income class, but continued with his predecessor’s neoliberal macroeconomic policies.

Moreover, other academics view his successful mandate as a period of ‘luck,’ due to the high prices of the commodities, which enhanced the possibility to finance many social programs that would benefit the lower class he was able to grow exponentially his popularity. Further, on these lines, the author Petras says that Lula could be seen as a ‘Third Way’ leader. The term ‘third way’ is clothed with the process of ‘re-democratization’ in Latin America. Within the framework of a ‘third-way’ politician, authors such as Coutinho and Chodor analysis, associate Lula’s administration with the concept of ‘passive revolution.’ As defined by Coutinho, the passive revolution is characterized by two stages: The restoration and renovation (Coutinho 2012). In the first stage, the masses will try to empower themselves within the hierarchical structure of the society, however, they will find resistance from the top (elites) that are afraid of the radicalization of the demands posed by the ‘dominated’- which was the case when Lula was campaigning for the first two times (Coutinho 2012,120). In the second stage concessions by the top will be made, and the highest reflection of these concessions will be the growth of a welfare State, in other words, the redistribution of resources (Coutinho 2012,121). The result was a hybrid project, which combined neoliberalism with neo-structuralism developmental policies, and this combination can also be identified in the ‘third- way” frame (Chodor 2014, 121).Furthermore, as argued by Chodor the country has experienced a ‘passive revolution,’ due to the incorporation of demands of those from below – sometimes Lula went even further incorporating social movements to political parties to ensure their passivity (Chodor 2014, 124). Furthermore, literature diverges depending on which definition of ‘populism’ they attain; nevertheless, Lula remains a controversial case.

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And Big Data is the collection and aggregation of informational data on large datasets that are going to be analyzed to reveal patterns and associations. Thus, Artificial Intelligence technology and Big Data are complementary. The excitement around AI and Big Data stand on the fact that together they have the ability to identify patterns that cannot be detected by human cognition.

After the attacks of 9/11, there has been an unprecedented gathering of private informational data of citizens for security reasons in the United States, which gave rise to what experts have been calling the age of ‘capitalist surveillance.’ The incentives linked to national security have pushed forward the development of technologies that would use human biometric information to properly identify citizens, and one of these technologies is known as Facial Recognition Technology (FRT) (Ibid;). In short, this technology uses an algorithm that matches the image of a face with one that has already been stored in its database. Today FRT is still used primarily for security purposes, such as law enforcement, and border controls.

In the past three decades, the way our society perceives and responds to risk has changed. One of the recent approaches to assess risks of the modern era was advanced by the sociologist U. Beck in 1992. Given the incredible technological changes, he decided to study the fears and transformations of social attitudes towards risks. And argued that risks in modern society are central to the political and social conflicts as they became the prime characteristic of the world order today (Neri & Cozmani 2019, 663). Beck argues that “modernity is a project of social and technological control by a nation-state.”Thus, he coined the term risk society to define the systematic way in which we today deal with hazards and uncertainties which have been induced by the process of modernization (technological changes). The theory holds that today risks are self-induced, so they are reflexive but ‘unintended’ consequences of human activities. In other words, today we aim to manage risks that have been produced by ourselves; this occurrence is also called ‘reflexive modernity’.

Thus, risk society is an unavoidable condition of modernity, and it concerns everyone. Today Facial recognition technology is an example of the ‘reflexive modernity’ in which we live. Indeed, this technology was primarily developed to manage certain risks related to national security and public safety. However, throughout time and due to its advancements this technology has become a source of risk itself. The main risk identified by experts and most of the actors involved in the development of Facial Recognition Technology concerns privacy rights, which is a risk that brings major ethical concerns. The core of this concern stands on the biometric informational data that is obtained, stored, shared, and further used for different purposes by different agencies and that citizens are not aware that this is happening.

Today, the traditional regulations that protect the privacy rights of individuals do not account for this kind of collection of informational data. It is important to highlight that the right to privacy is granted as a fundamental human right, by article 12 of the Human Rights Declaration. And it is an essential source to balance the power relationship between governments and citizens, and between citizens and big private businesses (Nakar 2010, 100). In fact, most of the leading actors involved in the development of Facial Recognition Technology, such as Google, Amazon, IBM, and Microsoft have been recognizing that the risk of this technology is indeed related to the potential for its abuse which may lead to the violation of fundamental rights (Justin 2015).The private actors manifested their concerns with regard to FRT. For instance, Microsoft reported that the risks are associated with the potentiality that governments will have on surveilling citizens while violating people’s freedom. Also, the company stressed that the algorithms that work for FRT accuracy are not yet fully reliable, thus it is dangerous to use it on a large scale as there are problems with bias identification (Smith 2018). Another example is found in a letter to Congress written by IBM which pointed out its concerns on how the technology will be used by law enforcement agencies. The main risk highlighted by the company concerned the abuse of FRT for surveillance purposes, leading to the violation of freedoms and basic human rights (IBM Letter to Congress, 2020).

Moreover, also civil rights groups outsourced their concerns with regards to surveillance and privacy rights. For instance, ‘Fight for the Future’ a US civil rights group has emphasized and manifested their distrust towards the motivations behind the development of FRT by these big companies, and its sale and agreements with the public sphere (e.g. police departments). Also, another example is the non-partisan independent watchdog POGO that has recently testified in Congress its concerns with regards to misidentification, bias algorithm, the potential to surveillance. They compared the use of this technology with no regulation to authoritarian countries such as China and Russia.

Technology clearly advances faster than privacy legal protections. According to Brookman, the US legal framework that should protect personal data privacy is still very weak, especially when compared to the European one (2020, 358). Indeed, in the United States, federal and state laws select only specific datasets to protect, that is considered to be sensitive, such as children’s information. Rather than having affirmative privacy protection over most of the personal information (Brookman 2020, 259).

The creation of a regulatory regime for FRT is still an ongoing process in the United States. Private and public actors are still in the phase of assessing the risks and defining the standard-setting for a viable regulatory framework that would encompass all. Until today, it is possible to find some regulations in specific states/cities that were brought by the public sector, and some self-regulatory measures taken by different companies that deal with FRT to decelerate the sales and developments.

In this case of Facial Recognition Technology, there is a significant reliance on alternative types of regulations, in particular, there is growing support for self-regulation. However, none of them have been precisely targeting the risk that concerns privacy rights, although many private actors have been alerting about the risk.Self-regulation happens when the target – to which the regulations apply – and the regulator – who enforces the rules – are the same individual-firm/industry or company. Indeed, companies such as Microsoft, Amazon, Google, Identix Incorporated, have already adopted some self-regulations in the past year.

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An interesting example that led me to reflect on the subject was the judgment in the United States Supreme Court, known as Masterpiece Cakeshop vs. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.A baker (Jack Phillips) from the state of Colorado in the United States refused to create a wedding cake for a gay couple because of personal religious beliefs. The couple decided to sue the baker for ‘discrimination and for that reason Jack Phillips was sued by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. This was possible because Colorado state law prohibits companies from refusing service based on factors of race, sex, marital status, or sexual orientation. When the Jack Phillips case reached the American Supreme Court, a historic decision was made. The supreme court condemned the State Commission for violating the protection of religious freedom, guaranteed by the United States Constitutional Amendment that ensures:

“Congress should not make any law regarding a religious establishment, or prohibit its free exercise, or restrict freedom of expression, or the press; or the right of people to assemble peacefully, and to make requests to the government to make reparations for complaints “.The right to express what you believe puts you in a position vulnerable to criticism, reactions, feedbacks (positive or negative). And in this space of debate that is created, the possibility of rethinking, improving, reformulating his thoughts opens up through the challenges that are presented to him in exchange for his idea.

This process has the power to polish the thoughts of our society, and as such, evolve our critical thinking. Taking away this right, or partially denying it, implies cutting back with the evolution and social transformation that must occur so that we can concretely define in which world we want to live over time. If, for example, an individual cannot express his conviction because it is considered offensive, and consequently does not have the opportunity to be challenged by arguments against the suppression of the individual’s conviction, it will cause great social discomfort. Faced with this uncomfortable scenario provoked by bland censorship, the individual’s conviction will remain stagnant in its most primitive form and will lead him to search for other alternatives to express his thoughts.

It is clear that in the political scene this was manifested in the candidacy of Jair Bolsonaro, Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, who incorporated and expressed the convictions that had been repressed for a long time with the defect that did not undergo a process of polishing ideas.The classic argument used to suppress many convictions is based on the famous phrase “We are in the 21st century, and this should not be discussed further. ” Being thus one of the most arrogant beliefs of recent times; this statement shows the lack of humility that people have today to think that the ‘true’ for them is the ‘true’ for everyone and that there is no need to open dialogue.

However, the issues of humanity and the problems involving human interaction are not so simple to discuss and resolve. And until today, freedom of expression and dialogue with arguments has brought us ‘democracy.

Limiting our right to freedom of expression has two consequences. First, what is offensive, and whoever determines what is offensive will always be biased towards those in power, or those (nowadays) that cause the most empathy. Second, defining these limits (of what offends and what does not offend) creates a culture less tolerant and obsessed with its own ideas that, because they are not challenged, leave aside the humility of the thinker and deny the possibility of the evolution of society’s thinking.

If the feelings of certain groups or individuals began to take on a higher value than freedom of expression, our society will be condemned to victims and arrogance, with a state that will exercise a new role as a protective father to those who were never humble enough to listen.

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This change, coupled with the technological advances of the 1970s made data become an asset for any candidate that wanted to win an election (Kreiss 2010, 1034). Moreover, with the emergence of the Internet in the 1990s, micro-targeted campaign practices were “institutionalized,” most of the political candidates started having access to those practices that would allow them to efficiently deliver information to those voters that did not seem committed enough (Kreiss 2010, 1035).At the beginning of the 21st century, campaigns started adopting the same techniques used for commercial advertisements, analyzing the voluminous amount of consumer data (Turow 2012, 5). Mitt Romney (Governor of Massachusetts) was one of the first in using the technique of microtargeting when he run in 2002 for governor. At the time, the data collected was about voter’s political preferences and consumers’ habits, and the targeted messages were delivered by phone and emails by the administrator of Romney’s campaign (Bimber 2014, 138.) Also, by then, presidential campaigns started using the Internet as a powerful tool for mobilization. Indeed, in 2004 data was used to find large groups of voters who had similar and specific characteristics, including psychological characteristics, so that the message could be a better target mainly using the Internet. Therefore, groups were targeted with the ‘right’ political message (Ibid; 2014, 138).

Nevertheless, the data infrastructure combined with data analytics techniques to gather supporters were powerfully combined in the 2008 presidential campaign. While in 2004, there were still difficulties in emailing all supporters, by 2008 the Obama campaign was sending 13 million emails constantly to its supporters (Kreiss 2010, 1037). Scholars emphasize how the Obama campaign of 2008 and more specifically the last of 2012 marked history because of its new algorithms and amount of data that was gathered. In both electoral years, data analytics provided personal communicative innovations in the electoral context, which turned out to be crucial in the following years. The mobilization of supporters, involving fundraising, with other campaign activities was unprecedented in US history. Obama was able to involve different social movements and identitarian groups personalizing and directing his message to individuals.Additionally, particularly after those campaigns in the US, policymakers, and scholars have started to identify and respond to the different issues that are associated with data-driven political campaigns (Crain 2020, 374). One of the issues concerns the fact that data-driven political campaigns have rapidly evolved but in a transformative way. In other words, data has quietly transformed some aspects of American society, replacing certain ideas of privacy, transparency, and even democracy with new definitions that are still not clear to the public (Mittelstadt 2016, 10). And this transformation brings up another important issue when talking about data analytics in the US, which concerns the lack of regulations.

Despite these practices of collecting, profiling, using, and disseminating data, the US presents almost no regulation that involves the new practices of microtargeting and profiling. According to Kreiss, in the US, the interest of politicians and data-driven political campaigns is aligned against regulations that would protect privacy rights and transparency when it comes to utilizing instruments such as microtargeting and profiling (Kreiss 2010, 1045). The interests of US political leadership and large data mining firms are closely aligned against the state regulation that would secure transparency in data practices. In light of this, another current important issue revolved around the involvement of private companies, such as Google and Facebook in the public sphere. Therefore, one can argue that the practice of political microtargeting is not something new, but is a tool that is being developed throughout the years, and every new election seems to be more efficient. The presidential campaigns of Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 marked history and raised particular interest on how big data is being used for political purposes.

Obama’s Campaign 2008
The manager of the Obama Campaign in 2008, David Plouffe, claimed that data analytics was central for Obama to become the favorite candidate in the primaries, and the winner in the general elections (Kreiss 2010, 1033). Indeed, since the beginning, great investments were made to gather and process sophisticated data-driven information about voters. Not only new platforms were created, but also social networks were used and adjusted to enhance citizen engagement with the Obama campaign (Bimber 2014, 131). His campaign used a different range of social media, including Facebook, Migente, Linkedin, and Digg.

It used targeted and constant communication via SMS and emails. The campaign bought significant spaces for advertisements, especially on Youtube – where it posted videos encouraging people to share and spread them. All these new experiments turned out to be successfully efficient (Ibid;131). Moreover, another important innovation was that all the collection and process of informational and political data was done in conjunction with some private companies. The most known during the Obama campaign was Catalist, a for-profit organization that managed the voter database. Together with the administrators of the campaign, they collected informational and political data on more than 250 million Americans through surveys and other forms of data collection (Kreiss 2010, 1033). Another private company, Strategic Telemetry, that provides microtargeting and data analysis services were hired to create voter models that organized all the collected data into simple groups of ‘type of voters.’ This service was utilized to micro-target political messages (Kreiss 2012, 71). The involvement of private companies in the gathering and processing of data about citizens coupled with privacy rights issues fueled a series of ethical questions concerning how data-driven campaigns were influencing the electoral outcome; and how harmful can be the involvement of these private companies in the public sphere.Obama’s Campaign 2012

The Obama campaign of 2012 has a very similar portfolio of the one in 2008, however, as stated by Mark Sullivan, the 2008 campaign was “prehistoric” compared to the amount of informational and political data gathered and processed in 2012 (Pilkington et.al, 2012). This time, 40% of the headquarter staff were dedicated to data and technology (Trish 2018, 31). Indeed, the data analytics was five times bigger the one of the previous campaign (Bimber 2014, 141). There are two simple reasons for this increment. First, candidates understood the value of data, and heavily invested in this department. The second reason was that more people were present on social media. At the beginning of the campaign in September 2011, Obama had 10 million followers on Twitter and gained 12 million more by the end of the elections. Moreover, the ‘types of voters’ categorized and targeted by Obama were the most present on social media in terms of population. For instance, 60% of people who voted for Obama were under the age of 30 and they happened to be the greatest part of the population present on social networks ( Bimber 2014, 139). The commodification of social media had a clear impact on the voter’s behavior and communication (Ibid; 140). Moreover, the new algorithms of the voter models could identify why certain people acted in specific ways, find their weakness, and detect what would be the appropriate message to make them change their minds.

In short, these new algorithms were able to turn uncommitted people into perfect committed supporters. This practice of microtargeting which used a great number of predictions based on informational data collected went far beyond a simple categorization of people into groups. Moreover, in 2012, the campaign also tied up and strengthen relations with private companies such as Facebook, which was a vital player during the Obama campaign (Turow 2012, 6). An example of this is the following fact: in 2012, an individual that logged- in on the website of the campaign through his/her personal Facebook account was allowing the campaign to gather information and political data on all his/her Facebook friends (Ibid; 7). Jim Messina – campaign manager – stated the importance of social media in 2012, which was no longer being handled as an experiment like in 2008, but it was rather taken as a central instrument to win the elections. One of the many innovative strategies that took place in 2012 was the technique that citizens could donate for the campaign via SMS, in a fast and efficient manner. This strategy was so successful that the Obama campaign got more than 60 percent of 514 million dollars came from individual voters who donated less than $200 (Bimber 2014, 139). Obama’s campaigns reformulated how citizens participate in the political process and reinforced the importance of data for political candidates (Mavriki 2019,11). Nancy Scola, a technology reporter called Obama “ Big Data President” (Trish 2014, 34).

Sci, a voler riaprire gli impianti sono proprio le Regioni più a rischio

L'articolo Data Driven Political Campaigns in the US proviene da Business.it.

However, with the expansion of the illicit drug market, and with the arrival of cocaine in the market (the 70s), new job alternatives were created, which consequently increased the number of employment and positions for the youngest in the community and the exchange now was money.The great lack of political representation in the favelas (slums) generated what some habitants call a “necessary evil:” as means of personal survival a mutual and collaborative relationship has been established between the residents of the favelas and the ‘owners’ of the drug traffic. On the one hand, the drug ‘lords’ fulfill the role of the state and provide for the maintenance of social order, for the development of a local economy, and the investments of leisure activities for the residents.

L. Downdey argues that the favelas have Brazilian democracy for ‘narcocracy’ where the social and economic structure that has been developed coopt residents to deal with the illicit trade of drugs – directly or indirectly. On the other hand, the community obeys the code of silence to protect the traffickers from any police intervention, for the sake of maintaining a good degree of stability. One of the residents once told, that calling the police is the last thing you should do, any crime committed within the community must be solved with the drug lords and the police should always stay out of the favelas. Moreover, obeying the law of favelas, and providing places and the right environment for the illicit trades and sales is what habitants ensure to the organized crime. This collaboration is an ever-present reality to the residents as the only concrete possibility for survival, especially for the young generation.What has been described is the reality where low-income families raise their children. The entrance into the ‘underworld’ usually begins early, at the age of 12. Although, some reports have lately shown that in recent years they have been starting earlier, around the age of 8 or 9 years old. This has an enormous socio-economic impact, as 80% of these children leave their studies when they are still progressing through elementary school. However, it is important to highlight that the ‘recruitment’ does not happen all of a sudden, as research indicates we have solid evidence to prove that children get gradually closer to the traffic.

First, easy and fast money appears to be the main reason for children to drop out of school and get involved with the narco-traffic. Often the money is used to help their families or to buy what they wish. It is clear that the economic and social vulnerability which is given by the conditions of the poor communities in which they are born and raised deeply influences their future choices.

The main reasons for their willingness to enter the drug-traffic system are indeed related to the tremendous economic vulnerability of their families which many times lead to the lack of a solid family structure. The desire to have money, to be able to consume, to have a ‘status’ that gives them importance and recognition within the society they live in moves these children early on to these kinds of jobs related to narco-trafficking.However, it has also been found in research that many seek a way out after a few months or after a few years. The motives behind are related to fear; fear of dying, fear of making a mistake, and being punished, fear of armed conflicts, fear of being betrayed, fear of threats. Being aware of death as a daily experience is the reality of these children. A fear that is supported by statistics, as there is an increase in firearm deaths among young men in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas (recognized as the leading cause of death) where every 1 girl 12 boys die by homicide between 15 and 19 years.

Acknowledging and admitting the magnitude of the problem is key in order to encourage the creation of debates within all social classes where various actors of society, public and private, can reflect on the broad issues that this topic covers. It is a big human capital loss for the country, and is a concerning societal problem, as we are talking about the future generation. Besides, children and adolescents should not only be seen as victims, but also as part of the solution to find a breaking point to this problem. A first concrete objective that Brazilians should propose in their communities is: to avoid increasing the vulnerability of these children and adolescents.

Bibliography

“Children on the Drug Trade A Case Study of Children in Organised Armed Violence in Rio De Janeiro” by Luke Downdey

“Rotas de Fuga Lições Aprendidas s no desenvolvimento de metodologias de prevenção e criação de alternativas para adolescentes e jovens no tráfico de drogas” by Fernando Lannes Fernandes Andréa Rodriguez

Pesquisa revela aumento de crianças entre 10 e 12 anos no tráfico de drogas do Rio

L'articolo The exposure of Brazilian Children to the Drug Trafficking Network proviene da Business.it.

Given the nature of Latin American economies and their position in the global markets the region has been profoundly affected by the fall of commodities, the estimation is that the value of the region’s exports to China (an important trading partner especially for Brazil, Chile, and Peru) will drop this year by 10.7% (ECLAC source). Moreover, we have witnessed the interruption of global value chains, combined with a surge of capital outflows, a sharp decrease in remittances, increase of bonds’ yields next to currency depreciation challenging countries like Argentina and Ecuador in the repayment of their debts. While developed economies have the ‘luxury’ to inject liquidity in their systems, Latin American countries have to face the precariousness of their economic system, while dealing with harsher fiscal constraints as borrowing becomes expensive.One of the often unaddressed structural weaknesses of the region is informality, which has been deeply affected by the pandemic. According to ILO (International Labour Organization), 53% of Latin American workers operate in the informal sector. The enforcement of a lockdown in these countries have had important consequences as it prevents an informal worker from earning his/her basic income; as this large portion of the workforce is left outside social protection schemes, they are completely unshielded from external shocks. According to ECLAC “ in a scenario of no labor income whatsoever, the probability of maintaining socioeconomic status is low: just 14% of people would maintain their original position and the risk of falling into poverty increases to 55%” (ECLAC, 2019: 72).

As Latin American governments make a big effort to expand social programs especially Conditional Cash Transfers such as Bolsa Familia in Brazil, Ingreso Familiar de Emergencia in Argentina, Ingreso Solidario in Colombia (among others) the informal workforce falls outside the scope of these governments’ safety nets and they cannot be properly identified and assisted. Indeed, many of them do not even own a bank account where the cash benefit can be deposited, so even if we could identify the informal worker the costs of doing so will outweigh efficiency of the schemes in place, especially during such an unexpected crisis. Some countries have also delivered food baskets and post-payment of taxes/utilities as a way to help the most vulnerable, and of course in the short-term the impact of these measures is immediate, but they are unsustainable given the fiscal constraints. Innovative policy action is needed, and there is an urgent call to create a fiscal pact that contributes to the boost of formal jobs in the region. It is important to remember, that the informal sector is not only an obstacle for the consolidation of a more inclusive labour market, but also diminishes public revenues (as informal workers do not pay taxes) diminishing the State capacity to provide social assistance.

While some governments have tried to encourage a certain degree of formalisation so that informal workers would become eligible for some kind of support, the rigid regulations and costs associated with formalisation are still unattractive to many despite the consequences of the pandemic. It is known that smoothing bureaucracy and alleviating tax burdens is the way to go. In addition, Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP) have proved to have a positive impact in the past, and could be further incentivized today (e.g. Job training programs). But we also need forward thinking ideas that can help the future formalised worker to navigate the challenges of tomorrow. Policies that aim to increase formal employment should enhance digital work-related skills, in order to promote equity and labour inclusion not only today but also in the future.

Hopefully, the unfolding of this crisis might be sufficient motivation to reformulate our thoughts and approaches towards social protection in the region as the issues of informality are exacerbated more and more at every economic crisis.

Montesano fermato senza mascherina sbotta alla polizia: “È sequestro di persona”

L'articolo The ‘unseen’: the informal sector in Latin America during the pandemic proviene da Business.it.